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AN EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS OF THE 
RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE LENGTH, 
RESILIENCY, AND IMPACT OF FEDERAL 
REGULATIONS 
Anthony Moffa 
Since the rise of the modern administrative state we have seen a demonstra-
ble trend towards lengthier regulations. However, popular critiques of the admin-
istrative state that focus on the overall size of the Federal Register are misguided. 
They rest on the premise that more, and longer, regulations unduly burden indus-
try and the economy in general. However, movement towards lengthier and more 
detailed regulations could be rational and largely unproblematic. This study tests 
two potential rational explanations for the trend towards longer regulations: 
dubbed (1) “the insulation hypothesis” and (2) “the socially beneficial hypothe-
sis.” Each of these explanations embodies a theoretically rational decision. First, 
the insulation hypothesis rests on the idea that it would make sense for policy-
makers to include more detailed legal and scientific support in new regulations, 
and thereby increase their length relative to previous regulations, if the addition-
al detail provided more insulation from judicial review. Second, the socially ben-
eficial hypothesis rests on the idea that devoting relatively more time and re-
sources to each new rule would be appropriate if longer, newer regulations 
produced more net social benefits than older, shorter ones. The empirical analy-
sis set forth in this article combines data from a number of publicly available 
sources to test these hypotheses. The results, confirming “the socially beneficial 
hypothesis,” add to the canon of empirical analysis of administrative law, build-
ing on the work of Cass Sunstein, Cary Coglianese, and others. Recognizing an 
overly burdensome regulatory state, an undoubtedly worthwhile and vital check 
in a democratic society, requires more than simply counting the pages of regula-
tions. The results of this study should put some minds at ease, at least with respect 
to EPA regulations; they should also help better direct our scrutiny in the future. 
 
*  Associate Professor of Law, University of Maine School of Law. This Article has benefit-
ed greatly from the feedback received at the Sabin Colloquium on Innovative Environmental 
Law Scholarship at Columbia Law School and the Rocky Mountain Land Use Institute's En-
vironmental Scholarly Workshop at the University of Denver’s Sturm College of Law. 
Thanks to Ashley Fagan for her diligent research assistance. Many thanks are also due to 
Robert Bruce Thompson, Sarah Schindler, Thea Johnson, Richard Chen, and Justin Pidot for 
helpful feedback. Any errors are mine alone. 
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INTRODUCTION 
“For many decades, an ever-growing maze of regs, rules, and restrictions has 
cost our country trillions of dollars, millions of jobs, countless American facto-
ries, & devastated entire industries.”—President Donald J. Trump1 
“The era of big government is over.”—President William J. Clinton2 
A common criticism of the federal administrative state from presidents, 
politicians, pundits, policymakers, and even scholars has been that there are 
simply too many regulations. Often this criticism is accompanied by a theatric 
numerical or physical depiction of the pages in the Code of Federal Regulations 
or the Federal Register.3 Although these arguments have media appeal, they 
 
1  Michal Kranz, Trump Cut Literal Red Tape While Standing Next to a Massive Pile of Pa-
per to Make a Point About Big Government, BUS. INSIDER (Dec. 14, 2017), http://www.busin 
essinsider.com/trump-stood-next-to-a-huge-pile-of-paper-showing-big-government-2017-12  
[https://perma.cc/C6HR-KEBQ]. 
2  William Jefferson Clinton, President, U.S., State of the Union Address (Jan. 23, 1996), 
available at https://clintonwhitehouse4.archives.gov/WH/New/other/sotu.html [https://perma 
.cc/QRR7-QQT4]. 
3  See, e.g., Steven J. Davis, Regulatory Complexity and Policy Uncertainty: Headwinds of 
Our Own Making, HOOVER INSTITUTION 1, 1 (2017) (comparing the number of pages in the 
Code of Federal Regulations to 133 King James Bibles); Kranz, supra note 1 (depicting 
President Donald J. Trump next to large stacks of printed out pages). 
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misconstrue the reality of the data,4 while asking and answering the wrong 
question. It may be true that individual regulations have grown, and continue to 
grow, increasingly complex and lengthy to read, adding pages to the Federal 
Register at higher rates each year.5 Indeed, the data largely confirm the exist-
ence of such a trend.6 The movement towards longer and more detailed regula-
tions could be rational,7 and unproblematic. Despite the fundamental im-
portance of determining whether a relationship between length and some 
measure of effectiveness exists, no prior empirical study has directly addressed 
the issue.8 
This study begins to fill that void by testing two hypothesized rational ex-
planations for longer regulations: (1) “the insulation hypothesis” and (2) “the 
socially beneficial hypothesis.”9 The insulation hypothesis posits that it makes 
sense for policymakers to increase the length of new regulations relative to pre-
vious regulations because the additional pages provide more insulation from 
judicial review. Regulations that consistently get overturned impose costs on 
both the regulators and the regulated community, making the reduction of those 
costs a rational goal. The socially beneficial hypothesis posits that using more 
words for each new rule is appropriate because longer regulations produce 
more net social benefits. In other words, if individual regulations have grown in 
order to increase the net social benefits they provide or to better insulate them 
from judicial review, then the trend towards longer rules would be justified. If, 
on the other hand, regulations have become needlessly loquacious, then perhaps 
a change of course is in order. 
This paper attempts to answer the question of the trend’s rationality in 
terms of resilience and quantified benefits of administrative rules in the context 
of environmental regulations. The analysis relies on data compiled by the Of-
fice of the Federal Register10 and QuantGov11 to prove the existence of a trend; 
 
4  See infra Part II (revealing that the number of rules added to the Federal Register each year 
has actually decreased over time). 
5  See Davis, supra note 3, at 1. For example, the Clean Power Plan, finalized by the Envi-
ronmental Protection Agency on August 3, 2015 and published in the Federal Register on 
October 23, 2015, comprised over 300,000 words (data on file with author). 
6  See infra Figure 3 (demonstrating the increasing number of pages per rule over time). 
7  The term “rational” throughout means an administrative process that functions optimally 
in terms of the costs and benefits of the process itself—the value of the regulation for society 
is produced with the least wasted effort. In other words, an irrational administrative process 
would be one that utilizes more labor to produce regulations than is necessary to render those 
regulations effective for their underlying purpose and as resilient as possible. 
8  See infra Part I (discussing the empirical scholarship in the field and identifying this gap in 
the literature). 
9  These are just two potential rational explanations for crafting longer and more detailed 
regulations. Part I will discuss why these two explanations stand out for empirical analysis 
and serve as the focus of this piece. 
10  See OFFICE OF THE FED. REGISTER, FEDERAL REGISTER STATISTICS (2018), https://www. 
federalregister.gov/reader-aids/understanding-the-federal-register/federal-register-statistics 
[https://perma.cc/QHT4-ZPUW]. 
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the words and pages of the regulatory texts themselves to provide the data 
points on length; the regulatory impact and cost benefit analyses prepared by 
the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) to provide quantified social im-
pacts; and United States Courts of Appeal and United States Supreme Court 
opinions in cases reviewing EPA regulations to indicate likelihood of reversal. 
Applying a neutral, empirical lens, through which to evaluate the trend towards 
increasingly complex rulemaking, benefits administrative agencies, courts, and 
commentators by grounding discussions of reform. 
Environmental regulations constitute a significant portion of the pages of 
the Code of Federal Regulations and the Federal Register that political actors 
like to pile up for visuals.12 The EPA consequently takes the brunt of the popu-
lar criticism aimed at the expansive government bureaucracy and the pervasive 
administrative state.13 Rulemakings initiated by the EPA provide an important 
set of data on which to test the correlations that suggest rational explanations 
for the growing length and complexity of administrative rules. In addition to 
presenting empirical evidence on the perceived trend of increasing length of 
regulations over time, this study tests for correlations related to the hypotheses 
described above to determine whether or not longer regulations signal a move 
to a less effective and more inefficient, in other words irrational, administrative 
state. Ultimately, the results, reported in full below, supported one of the two 
primary hypotheses—the socially beneficial hypothesis. The study found a ro-
bust, statistically significant positive correlation between the number of words 
in a final rule and the EPA’s estimated net social benefits of that rule. 
Part I locates this study within the existing body of empirical legal scholar-
ship on administrative law. Part II begins the analysis by examining the trend 
towards longer regulations across all agencies in more detail, looking at all of 
the rules proposed and finalized in the Federal Register over time. Part III ex-
plains why the correlations tested herein are of particular interest. It discusses 
how the potential relationship between the length of rules and the rate of suc-
cess on judicial review is consistent with the theses of some administrative law 
scholars regarding the behavior of agencies and administrators. From the poli-
cymakers’ perspective, this part highlights how the potential relationship be-
tween the length of rules and their net social benefit is consistent with political 
 
11  QuantGov is an open-source platform that compiles data up to date on regulatory text, 
pulling from, among other sources, the eCFR. See Patrick A. McLaughlin & Oliver 
Sherouse, QuantGov—a Policy Analytics Platform, QUANTGOV (Dec. 20, 2017). 
12  See Patrick A. McLaughlin & Oliver Sherouse, RegData US 3.1 Annual (dataset),  
QUANTGOV (2018), https://quantgov.org/regdata-us/ [https://perma.cc/32JR-XW39] (last  
visited Jan. 6, 2020) (reporting the number of words added to the CFR by each agency every 
year from 1970–2017 in the “RegData 3.1 Agency Summary” subset). 
13  Arthur Pugsley, The Myth of EPA Overregulation, 39 ECOLOGY L.Q. 475, 478 (2012) (“A 
near-universal chorus on the political right, including elected officials and interest groups, 
has objected to the EPA as overregulating and thereby causing economic harm. Moreover, 
some Democrats have supported the effort to cut back on EPA regulations for the same rea-
son.”). 
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statements about rulemakings. Part IV presents the methodology, findings, and 
analysis regarding the first hypothesized correlation; Part V presents the meth-
odology, findings, and analysis regarding the second. Part VI further explores 
some other potential explanations for the initially observed trend towards long-
er regulations, as well as suggests areas for future study. Part VII discusses im-
plications of the findings for courts, policymakers, and scholars. Part VIII ex-
plicitly acknowledges the limitations of this study. 
I. PREVIOUS EMPIRICAL STUDIES OF THE ADMINISTRATIVE STATE 
Other scholars have endeavored to empirically examine the changes in the 
regulatory state in the modern era. Cornelius Kerwin and Scott Furlong con-
ducted a study that, like this work, attempted to demonstrate and explain a 
trend towards more complex regulations.14 However, rather than focusing on 
the length of individual rules, Kerwin and Furlong chose to study the duration 
from proposed rule to final rule.15 Specifically, they compiled data from the 
EPA’s internal regulatory tracking system on 150 non-routine rules promulgat-
ed between October 1, 1986, and September 30, 1989.16 Kerwin and Furlong 
then tested empirically (using proxies) some of the hypotheses prevalent in 
scholarship purporting to explain the variance in the passage of time from pro-
posal to final rule.17 Overall, the regression models they constructed explained 
 
14  Cornelius M. Kerwin & Scott R. Furlong, Time and Rulemaking: An Empirical Test of 
Theory, 2 J. PUB. ADMIN. RES. & THEORY 113, 130–31 (1992). 
15  See id. at 121. 
16  Id. at 122. 
17  Kerwin and Furlong described their methods, in part, as follows: 
We sought to develop measures to capture the complexity of subject matter, as well as the legal, 
bureaucratic, and political constraints. 
We were unable to measure directly the effects of complex subject matter on elapsed time be-
cause developing and applying objective measures proved too difficult; we used instead two ad-
mittedly crude indicators. First, we classified rules by program office to determine whether the 
general subject matter (e.g., air, water, or toxic substances) had any effect on elapsed time and, 
hence, on delay. Second, we considered the length of the rule, measured by the number of col-
umns it occupies in the Federal Register . . . . 
The effect of legal constraints was measured in several ways. Classifying rules by program of-
fice helped account for different procedural requirements written into authorizing statutes. We 
also included a measure of the potential impact of the rule—whether it was classified as major, 
significant, or minor—because these are associated with varying legal requirements as to the 
form of mandatory analyses . . . Because of its prominence in the literature and in policy debates, 
we also included OMB review time as a separate independent variable . . . . 
We measured in several ways bureaucratic factors that potentially influence the amount of time 
it takes to issue a rule. The number of participants in the rulemaking workgroup was a measure 
of organization complexity. . . . Finally, because the literature suggests that delay is reduced 
when senior agency management makes expeditious rulemaking a priority, we used an inde-
pendent variable to account for creation of an agency steering committee as a mechanism for 
better central management of the rulemaking. 
The political constraints on rulemaking, like the complexity of the subject matter, are difficult to 
measure with accuracy, so we again employed a surrogate: the number of public comments re-
ceived on the proposed rule. 
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approximately half of the variance in duration of the rulemaking process—a 
noteworthy result.18 The results confirmed empirically that the length of time 
for an EPA rule to go from proposed to final depends, at least to some signifi-
cant extent, on such variables as: the complexity of the regulated subject, the 
statutory process and evidentiary requirements, the bureaucracy involved, and 
political pressure on the agency.19 One might reasonably expect that those same 
factors would affect the length of a given rule, in addition to its time to promul-
gation. 
Indeed, some of those factors are closely related to the hypotheses tested 
herein; for example, political pressure and statutory requirements (specifically 
those enshrined in the Administrative Procedure Act) directly relate to whether 
and how a rule would be subject to judicial review.20 Other individual variables 
they tested seem more closely connected to internal agency time and priority 
management than to the length of a given rule. On a granular level, only one 
specific variable—the variable used to measure the attention a rule receives 
from high-level agency officials—proved significant in all three of Kerwin and 
Furlong’s models.21 That finding “lends support to anecdotal reports and pro-
fessional opinion regarding the positive effects on rule-making of agency-
leadership attention.”22 From both an intuitive and empirical perspective, the 
attention of agency leadership on a particular rulemaking suggests that the rule 
will be finalized in more timely fashion; however, one cannot say the same 
about the effect that the attention of leadership might have on the final rule’s 
length. 
One important assumption underlying the hypotheses tested here is that 
longer regulations require more agency resources to complete. Kerwin and Fur-
long’s results both support and challenge that assumption. Supporting that as-
sumption is their finding that the number of participants in work groups was 
not a significant predictor of the length of time from proposed to final rule, and 
to the extent it was related, the correlation was negative, suggesting that devot-
ing additional full-time employees (FTEs) to a rule sped up its promulgation.23 
 
Id. at 120–21. 
18  See id. at 130 (reporting that “[t]he models used account for between 41 and 57 percent of 
the variance in elapsed time, and all models proved to be statistically significant.”). 
19  Id. 
20  See, e.g., Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 704 (2018) (“Agency action made 
reviewable by statute and final agency action for which there is no other adequate remedy in 
a court are subject to judicial review. A preliminary, procedural, or intermediate agency ac-
tion or ruling not directly reviewable is subject to review on the review of the final agency 
action. Except as otherwise expressly required by statute, agency action otherwise final is 
final for the purposes of this section whether or not there has been presented or determined 
an application for a declaratory order, for any form of reconsideration, or, unless the agency 
otherwise requires by rule and provides that the action meanwhile is inoperative, for an ap-
peal to superior agency authority.”). 
21  Kerwin & Furlong, supra note 14, at 131. 
22  Id. 
23  See id. 
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Kerwin and Furlong also tested one measure of length—number of columns in 
the Federal Register entry—as a predictor of duration, but did not find a statis-
tically significant relationship.24 Taken together, those findings suggest that ad-
ditional resources, in the form of FTEs, could be devoted to specific rule-
makings based on something other than the schedule—perhaps the length and 
complexity of the rule. A devotion of resources in that manner, particularly if 
those resources assist in moving the process along, would explain why a rule’s 
length is not a good predictor of the time it takes for that rule to be finalized. 
On the other hand, the findings with respect to the lack of a relationship be-
tween the length of a rule and duration of the process might suggest that longer 
rules are not necessarily more work. 
A host of prominent scholars have empirically studied judicial review of 
administrative agency decisions.25 The design of these studies informed the 
methods employed here. The findings of these studies, particularly with respect 
to the rates of reversal, prove especially relevant to the analysis of findings on 
the “insulation hypothesis.”26 Because of these forerunners, there exists a foun-
dation upon which to build this study. Although some of these scholars at-
tempted to explain what drives judicial review decisions,27 none of them sought 
to examine the potential relationship between the length of rules and the likeli-
hood of their reversal or remand. Thus, this work fills that important gap. 
 
24  Id. 
25  See, e.g., James J. Brudney et al., Judicial Hostility Toward Labor Unions? Applying the 
Social Background Model to a Celebrated Concern, 60 OHIO ST. L.J. 1675, 1679–80 (1999); 
Kiki Caruson & J. Michael Bitzer, At the Crossroads of Policymaking: Executive Politics, 
Administrative Action, and Judicial Deference by the DC Circuit Court of Appeals (1985–
1996), 26 LAW & POL’Y 347, 349 (2004); Jason J. Czarnezki, An Empirical Investigation of 
Judicial Decisionmaking, Statutory Interpretation, and the Chevron Doctrine in Environ-
mental Law, 79 U. COLO. L. REV 767, 769 (2008); Kristin E. Hickman & Matthew D. Krue-
ger, In Search of the Modern Skidmore Standard, 107 COLUM. L. REV. 1235, 1238 (2007); 
Martha Anne Humphries & Donald R. Songer, Law and Politics in Judicial Oversight of 
Federal Administrative Agencies, 61 J. POL. 207, 211–12 (1999); Orin S. Kerr, Shedding 
Light on Chevron: An Empirical Study of the Chevron Doctrine in the U.S. Courts of Ap-
peals, 15 YALE J. REG. 1, 4 (1998); Thomas J. Miles & Cass R. Sunstein, The Real World of 
Arbitrariness Review, 75 U. CHI. L. REV. 761, 765–66 (2008) [hereinafter Miles & Sunstein, 
Real World]; Thomas J. Miles & Cass R. Sunstein, Do Judges Make Regulatory Policy? An 
Empirical Investigation of Chevron, 73 U. CHI. L. REV. 823, 825 (2006) [hereinafter Miles & 
Sunstein, Empirical Investigation]; Richard J. Pierce, Jr. & Joshua Weiss, An Empirical 
Study of Judicial Review of Agency Interpretations of Agency Rules, 63 ADMIN. L. REV. 515, 
519 (2011); Peter H. Schuck & E. Donald Elliott, To the Chevron Station: An Empirical 
Study of Federal Administrative Law, 1990 DUKE L.J. 984, 988 (1990); David H. Willison, 
Judicial Review of Administrative Decisions: Agency Cases Before the Court of Appeals for 
the District of Columbia, 1981–84, 14 AM. POL. Q. 317, 318 (1986). 
26  See infra Part II (explaining the hypotheses tested in this study). 
27  For example, Miles and Sunstein, in both of their prominent empirical studies of judicial 
review of agencies, focus on determining whether politics of judges, and of administrators, 
have a significant effect on the outcome. See Miles & Sunstein, Real World, supra note 25, 
at 781; Miles & Sunstein, Empirical Investigation, supra note 25, at 869–70. 
20 NEV. L.J. 733 
740 NEVADA LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 20:2  
II. GROWTH OF REGULATIONS 
By the end of 2016, the Federal Register encompassed just over 97,000 
pages, including over 60,000 devoted to final and proposed rules.28 According 
to QuantGov, as of January 9, 2020, there were a total of 103,167,288 words in 
the Code of Federal Regulations.29 These staggering numbers grow yearly, 
providing cannon fodder for the “regulatory reform” advocates in the popular 
media and the academy. However, the data present a more complicated picture. 
Contrary to the contentions of some prominent scholars,30 the regulatory 
state has not “ossified”31—at least not according to the data. Cary Coglianese 
first exposed the lack of empirical support for the ossification hypothesis in 
2008.32 Coglianese used simple data from the Code of Federal Regulations 
(CFR) and the Federal Register to demonstrate that “the regulatory state has in-
creased considerably in size and impact since the establishment of the APA and 
subsequent reforms, including OMB review.”33 According to Coglianese’s 
findings, the CFR has grown by a multiple of five since 1946, without demon-
strating any appreciable slowdown in growth since the advent of OMB re-
view.34 In fact, he found that, in 2006, the CFR contained approximately 33 
percent more pages than it did in 1980.35 Coglianese also reported that from 
approximately 1986 to 2006, the Federal Register included “about 4,000 new 
rules each year.”36 This work begins by updating and more closely examining 
this last figure. 
 
28  OFFICE OF THE FED. REGISTER, FEDERAL REGISTER & CFR PUBLICATION STATISTICS—
AGGREGATED CHARTS—AGGREGATED CHARTS (2016), https://www.federalregister.gov/ 
uploads/2017/04/stats2016Fedreg.pdf [https://perma.cc/R4DP-UWZT]. Under Section 553  
of the Administrative Procedure Act, “[g]eneral notice of proposed rule making shall be pub-
lished in the Federal Register,” followed by a period of public comment, before a rule issues 
and becomes effective (i.e., becomes a “final” rule). 5 U.S.C. § 553(b) (2018). 
29  The QuantGov Team, The QuantGov Regulatory Clock, QUANTGOV, https://quantgov.org 
/charts/the-quantgov-regulatory-clock/ [https://perma.cc/38DN-VULX] (last visited Jan. 9,  
2020). 
30  See, e.g., Thomas O. McGarity, Some Thoughts on “Deossifying” the Rulemaking Pro-
cess, 41 DUKE L.J. 1385, 1385–86 (1992); Richard J. Pierce, Jr., Rulemaking Ossification Is 
Real: A Response to Testing the Ossification Thesis, 80 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1493, 1494 
(2012). 
31  The term “ossification” has been used by scholars over the last three decades to describe a 
perceived decline in regulatory activity. See Jason Webb Yackee & Susan Webb Yackee, 
Testing the Ossification Thesis: An Empirical Examination of Federal Regulatory Volume 
and Speed, 1950–1990, 80 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1414, 1418 n.18 (2012) (reporting that the 
term “ossification” produced over 1000 hits in a search of documents in Westlaw’s Journals 
and Law Reviews database). 
32  Cary Coglianese, The Rhetoric and Reality of Regulatory Reform, 25 YALE J. ON REG. 85, 
92 (2008) [hereinafter Coglianese, Rhetoric and Reality]. 
33  Id. at 91. 
34  Id. 
35  Id. 
36  Id. 
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The reported Federal Register data indicates that these large numbers are 
not simply the result of an increasingly active administrative state over time, at 
least in terms of rules proposed and finalized.37 As Figure 1 shows, the number 
of rules added to the Federal Register each year has actually decreased over the 
period for which data is available.38 
FIGURE 1 
The regression model presented in Figure 1 demonstrates that the year 
serves as a fairly strong predictor of the number of proposed and final rules 
added to the Federal Register. The R-square numbers indicate that the regres-
 
37  See FEDERAL REGISTER STATISTICS, supra note 10. 
38  See infra Figure 1. 
 
MODEL SUMMARY 
Model R R Square Adjusted R Square Std. Error of the 
Estimate 
1 .865a .749 .735 6.163 
a. Predictors: (Constant), Combined, Proposed Rules 
 
Model R R Square Adjusted R Square Std. Error of the 
Estimate 
1 .864a .746 .740 6.114 
a. Predictors: (Constant), Combined 
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sion model explains almost three-quarters of the variance in the data.39 That is a 
comparatively strong result40 consistent with Coglianese’s observations.41 
Over that same period, the length of each rule added to the Federal Register 
has steadily increased.42 According to the Office of the Federal Register, the 
number of pages devoted to rules each year in the Federal Register has actually 
increased, despite the decline in the number of individual rules demonstrated 
above.43 Figure 2 presents this data graphically and again reports a statistically 
significant relationship, with the model accounting for approximately 68 per-




39  IBM, R-Squared Statistics, https://www.ibm.com/support/knowledgeceter/en/SSLVMB 
_25.0.0/statistics_casestudies_project_ddita/spss/tutorials/log_loan_rsquare.html[https://per
ma.cc/LRN9-VD4P] (last visited Jan. 6, 2020) (“In the linear regression model, the coeffi-
cient of determination, R2, summarizes the proportion of variance in the dependent variable 
associated with the predictor (independent) variables, with larger R2 values indicating that 
more of the variation is explained by the model, to a maximum of 1. For regression models 
with a categorical dependent variable, it is not possible to compute a single R2 statistic that 
has all of the characteristics of R2 in the linear regression model, so these approximations are 
computed instead. The following methods are used to estimate the coefficient of determina-
tion. . . . What constitutes a ‘good’ R2 value varies between different areas of application.  
While these statistics can be suggestive on their own, they are most useful when comparing 
competing models for the same data. The model with the largest R2 statistic is ‘best’ accord-
ing to this measure.”). 
40  See Kerwin & Furlong, supra note 14, at 130 (describing r-squares of 41 to 57 as a “mod-
est” results). 
41  See Coglianese, Rhetoric and Reality, supra note 32, at 92. 
42  See infra Figure 3. 
43  See FEDERAL REGISTER STATISTICS, supra note 10. 
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MODEL SUMMARY 
Model R R Square Adjusted R Square Std. Error of the 
Estimate 
1 .826a .682 .673 2861.565 
a. Predictors: (Constant), Year 
Combining the two sets of data yields an important figure for this study—
the number of pages per rule.44 During the 1970s, in the early years of the Envi-
ronmental Protection Agency and in the midst of the social regulation era, each 
new final or proposed rule (across all agencies) accounted for about two Feder-
al Register pages.45 Since then, that figure has nearly quintupled to almost ten 
Federal Register pages for each new rule (across all agencies).46 Furthermore, 
that pages per rule figure has been relatively, steadily increasing over time.47 
Figure 3 depicts these results graphically and presents a regression model quan-
tifying the strength of the relationship between pages per rule and year of the 
rule’s promulgation. 
Interestingly, this model performs the best of the three with respect to its 
R-square result. Over 90 percent of the variance in pages per rule can be ex-
plained by the year that the rule was promulgated, with newer rules (i.e., high-
er-numbered years) comprising more pages than older rules (i.e., lower-
numbered years). Again, this result confirms Coglianese’s contention that the 
regulatory state has not ossified, but also demonstrates that the nature of indi-
vidual rulemakings has changed over time. 
 
44  The pages per rules figures derive from dividing the “Rules Pages” in a given Federal 
Register year (see supra Figure 2) by the number of “Final Rules” published in that same 
year (see supra Figure 1). 
45  See infra Figure 3. 
46  See infra Figure 3. 
47  The general phenomenon of increasing length of rules since the 1970s was first observed 
and remarked upon by Jerry Mashaw in 1994, and, as the data here demonstrate in more pre-
cise detail, the trend has continued in the intervening two-plus decades. See Jerry L. 
Mashaw, Improving the Environment of Agency Rulemaking: An Essay on Management, 
Games, and Accountability, 57 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 185, 197 n.38 (1994) (“Constant or 
modestly increasing pages in the Federal Register rules sections combined with declining 
numbers of documents in those same sections lead to an obvious conclusion: the average 
length of documents filed with the Federal Register has been increasing from the mid 1970s 
until the present. Indeed, simple computation reveals that the average number of pages in the 
rules section of the Federal Register in 1991 as a percentage of that same average in 1975 is 
218 [percent]. The parallel percentage for the proposed rules sections is 225 [percent].”). 
Mashaw’s work set out to determine whether “policymaking by rule has become moribund 
or ‘ossified’ as some have argued” and, if so, “to reconsider the structure of agency rulemak-
ing as a mechanism of governance, quite apart from that mechanism’s substantive effects in 
particular instances.” Id. at 187. 
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FIGURE 3 
 
As this foundational data demonstrates, there can be little dispute that the 
individual regulations all agencies have been putting in place have become 
wordier over time.48 The empirical and logical analyses in the parts that follow 
reflect an effort to discern why. 
 
48  The data compiled and presented here do conflict to some degree with data presented in 
Anne Joseph O’Connell, Political Cycles of Rulemaking: An Empirical Portrait of the Mod-
ern Administrative State, 94 VA. L. REV. 889, 940 Chart 6 (2008). Specifically, O’Connell 
graphically presents the number of Notices of Proposed Rulemaking (NPRMs) over time as 
an indicator of regulatory activity. See id. O’Connell’s data does not show a decline in 
NPRMs over time, which contrasts with the decline in rules and proposed rules over time 
reported by the Office of the Federal Register and analyzed above. Id. There are a few poten-
tial explanations for the discrepancy, the first of which being that NPRMs have not histori-
cally been issued for every rulemaking. The second explanation has to do with the composi-
tion of O’Connell’s dataset, which she constructed using “federal agency reports in the 
Unified Agenda, which is published twice a year in the Federal Register, from 1983 to 
2003.” Id. at 924. These reports included agency-provided information on rulemakings, in-
cluding the date of the NPRM, “the date(s) of the comment period(s), [and] the date [of] the 
final rule” or withdrawal. Id. As O’Connell herself concedes, the database “has some disad-
vantages” the most significant of which being that the information included in the Unified 
Agenda is all self-reported by the agencies. Id. at 927. Particularly relevant to the focus of 
this piece, at least one prominent scholar, Jerry Mashaw, contends that “[t]he EPA . . . does 
MODEL SUMMARY 
Model R R Square Adjusted R Square Std. Error of the 
Estimate 
1 .958a .918 .916 .54152 
a. Predictors: (Constant), Year 
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III. HYPOTHESES TESTED (AND UNTESTED) 
As explained in brief above, the aim of this work is to test two potential 
explanations for crafting longer regulations: (1) “the insulation hypothesis” and 
(2) “the socially beneficial hypothesis.” Each of these explanations embodies a 
theoretically rational decision on the part of administrators allocating resources. 
First, the insulation hypothesis posits that it makes sense for policymakers to 
include more detailed legal and scientific support in new regulations, and 
thereby increase their length relative to previous regulations, because the addi-
tional detail provides more insulation from judicial review. In other words, 
more resources devoted to writing a longer rule are well spent if they better 
protect the rule from invalidation by a court. Second, the socially beneficial hy-
pothesis posits that devoting relatively more resources to each new rule is ap-
propriate because longer regulations produce more net social benefits. In other 
words, a new rule being twice as long as an older rule is just as efficient (in 
terms of the costs associated with drafting and publishing) if it is also twice as 
beneficial to society. The analyses that follow attempt to test these hypotheses 
by looking for statistically significant correlations in the data.49 
The universe of possible reasons for the trend observed in Part I is much 
broader than the two hypotheses that this work seeks to test empirically. Many 
of these potential explanations, however, would prove difficult to empirically 
test. For example, one potential explanation for regulations increasing in length 
over time is that the subjects of rulemaking have become increasingly complex 
and sophisticated over that same time period,50 necessitating more detailed reg-
ulations to prevent workarounds and reach all elements of the regulated indus-
tries. Another such difficult-to-test hypothesis would be that policymakers have 
become more risk averse or better educated over time. One could hypothesize 
that with increased risk aversion or years in higher education, rule-writers 
would tend towards lengthier, more complex proposals. In contrast, the insula-
tion and socially beneficial hypotheses present two opportunities for empirical 
study based on the available data from court decisions and the EPA’s mandated 
cost-benefit analyses. 
 
not report any rulemaking activity that it considers insignificant [to be included in the Uni-
fied Agenda].” Mashaw, supra note 47, at 198 n.41. O’Connell explicitly disputes Mashaw’s 
account but does ultimately agree with his contention “that it is not feasible ‘for the untu-
tored eye to discern from the reporting in the Unified Agenda . . . whether activity levels are 
primarily in a regulatory or deregulatory direction.’ ” O’Connell, supra, at 928 (quoting 
Mashaw, supra note 47, at 198 n.41). 
49  Statistical significance refers to the confidence that a correlation (positive or negative) 
found in the data is not the product of random variation. This work will utilize a confidence 
level of 95 percent to define statistical significance. See Amy Gallo, A Refresher on Statisti-
cal Significance, HARVARD. BUS. REV. (Feb. 16, 2016), https://hbr.org/2016/02/a-refresher- 
on-statistical-significance. 
50  Cf. H. Jeffrey Leonard, Confronting Industrial Pollution in Rapidly Industrializing Coun-
tries: Myths, Pitfalls, and Opportunities, 12 ECO. L.Q. 779, 780–81 (1985) (describing how 
industrialization leads to increasing complexity in sources of industrial pollution). 
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Still other potential explanations were not the focus of this piece due to the 
lack of significant implications for law and policy; though some of those poten-
tial explanations are explored briefly.51 For example, one reason for longer reg-
ulations might simply be improvement in technology on which the regulations 
are drafted (i.e., personal and laptop computers).52 
The insulation and socially beneficial hypotheses, whether proved or dis-
proved by the data, could influence how closely courts scrutinize rules in the 
future and how agencies allocate their limited rulemaking resources. These are 
but a few of the numerous other explanations, some of which may indeed de-
serve study.53 Nonetheless, the results testing these two explanations provide an 
opportunity to expand the critical conversation around regulatory reform. 
The hypotheses selected here stand out as important for empirical study 
because they are consistent with the statements made by policymakers in pro-
motion of new rules54 and the analyses of those rules by some administrative 
law scholars.55 Both groups tend to point to the erosion of deference by courts 
(i.e., the need to provide more information and support to insulate rules from 
judicial invalidation) and to the economic significance of new major rules (i.e., 
the massive net benefits of longer, more recent rules, as compared to older, 
shorter rules).56 
 
51  See infra Part V. 
52  See Lois Mayer Nichols, Pencil and Paper Versus Word Processing: A Comparative 
Study of Creative Writing in the Elementary School, 29 J. RES. ON COMPUTING EDUC. 159, 
160 (1996) (finding, in a study of elementary school students, that those using computers 
wrote compositions with significantly more words and sentences than those writing with 
pencil and paper). 
53  See infra Part V for some suggestions regarding future areas of study. 
54  See, e.g., Barack Obama, President, U.S., Remarks by the President in Announcing the 
Clean Power Plan (Aug. 3, 2015), https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the-press-office/ 
2015/08/03/remarks-president-announcing-clean-power-plan [https://perma.cc/T2GN-FS9X]  
(describing the Clean Power Plan as “a plan two years in the making, and the single most 
important step America has ever taken in the fight against global climate change.”). 
55  See, e.g., Cary Coglianese, Empirical Analysis and Administrative Law, 2002 U. ILL. L. 
REV. 1111, 1130 (2002) (describing the “ossification hypothesis, which supposes that agen-
cies have to work harder to produce rules that will withstand judicial scrutiny.”) [hereinafter 
Coglianese, Empirical Analysis]; Sidney A. Shapiro & Richard E. Levy, Heightened Scruti-
ny of the Fourth Branch: Separation of Powers and the Requirement of Adequate Reasons 
for Agency Decisions, 1987 DUKE L.J. 387, 412 (1987) (analogizing the statement of basis 
and reasons provided by an agency in a rulemaking to judicial opinion writing, “giv[ing] a 
‘reasoned elaboration’ for . . . actions according to norms of consistent, neutral and candid 
decisional processes.”). 
56  See infra Parts IV and V. 
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IV. THE INSULATION HYPOTHESIS 
A. Introduction 
The first potential correlation this work will investigate is the relationship 
between the length of a rule (measured in Federal Register pages) and the fate 
of that rule on judicial review. Such an analysis is of interest because it is now 
common practice in Federal Register entries for agencies to explain in painstak-
ing detail the components of the administrative record, and even the legal anal-
ysis, supporting a particular rulemaking.57 Some commentators have analogized 
this function of the administrative record to judicial opinion writing, which 
“give[s] a ‘reasoned elaboration’ for [] actions according to norms of con-
sistent, neutral and candid decisional processes.”58 It is quite possible that 
agencies, and their counsel, have determined that explaining the reasoning be-
hind an agency action in the public record, rather than just before a court, 
makes that action less likely to be deemed “arbitrary and capricious” under the 
Administrative Procedure Act (APA).59 
Judicial review of agency action is confined, except for a few narrow ex-
ceptions, to the administrative record.60 The record includes much more than 
the text of the rule itself, but agencies still use the Federal Register entry for a 
rule to explain in detail the specific record components they are relying on. For 
example, when the EPA published the “endangerment finding” with respect to 
greenhouse gases, it stated “[t]he major assessments by the U.S. Global Climate 
Research Program (USGCRP), the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change 
(IPCC), and the National Research Council (NRC) serve as the primary scien-
tific basis supporting the Administrator’s endangerment finding.”61 The notice 
did not stop there; it included an entire section devoted to explaining why those 
studies “compellingly support[ed]”62 the finding63 and directed the reader to its 
“Technical Support Document (TSD)” summarizing the major assessments 
 
57  See, e.g., Repeal of the Clean Power Plan and Revisions to Emissions Guidelines, 84 Fed. 
Reg. 32, 520 (July 8, 2019) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pt. 60) (including two separate sec-
tions heavily laden with legal analysis, one laying out the legal basis for repeal of the Clean 
Power Plan and another laying out the authority for the regulation of electric generating 
units). 
58  Shapiro & Levy, supra note 55, at 412. 
59  See infra notes 68-75 and accompanying text. 
60  Fla. Power & Light Co. v. Lorion, 470 U.S. 729, 744 (1985) (“If the record before the 
agency does not support the agency action, if the agency has not considered all relevant fac-
tors, or if the reviewing court simply cannot evaluate the challenged agency action on the 
basis of the record before it, the proper course, except in rare circumstances, is to remand to 
the agency for additional investigation or explanation.”). 
61  Endangerment and Cause or Contribute Findings for Greenhouse Gases Under Section 
202(a) of the Clean Air Act, 74 Fed. Reg. 66,497 (Dec. 15, 2009). 
62  Id. 
63  See id. 
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listed.64 The section explaining the EPA’s scientific analysis concluded with a 
statement emphasizing the reasonableness of the EPA’s reliance on the afore-
mentioned assessments.65 
The data collected and analyzed here focus specifically on “arbitrary and 
capricious review” of the substance of EPA rules, as distinct from the review of 
the EPA’s interpretation of statutory mandates pursuant to Chevron v. Natural 
Resources Defense Council.66 Separating empirical analyses of cases applying 
these two standards of review is consistent with the approach taken by Thomas 
Miles and Cass Sunstein.67 Not only is it empirically sound, but logically con-
sistent with the hypothesis tested. As described above, the insulation hypothesis 
embodies an approach to rulemaking that justifies long and detailed rules by 
pointing to courts’ increasingly searching inquiries into the scientific and eco-
nomic rationale for those rules. The APA’s “arbitrary and capricious” clause 
provides the basis for such review.68 In contrast, the Chevron deference doc-
trine concerns the statutory authority for a given rule, rather than the rationale 
underlying its substance.69 
 Under the APA, an agency action is unlawful if it is “arbitrary, capricious, 
an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with law.”70 As the Su-
preme Court has noted, the reviewing court must determine whether the agency 
based its decision on a consideration of “the relevant factors” or whether it 
made “a clear error of judgment.”71 Such a determination necessarily entails a 
“searching and careful” fact-specific inquiry, but “the ultimate standard of re-
 
64  Id. at 66,497 n.1. 
65  Id. at 66,511 (“In summary, EPA concludes that its reliance on existing and recent syn-
thesis and assessment reports is entirely reasonable and allows EPA to rely on the best avail-
able science.”). 
66  Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 843–44, 862 (1984) 
(the Supreme Court famously laid out the boundaries of agencies’ discretion in interpreting 
their statutory mandates and acting upon those interpretations). 
67  Compare Miles & Sunstein, Real World, supra note 25, at 766 (analyzing arbitrariness 
review), with Miles & Sunstein, Empirical Investigation, supra note 25, at 825 (analyzing 
the application of Chevron deference). 
68  5 U.S.C. § 706 (2018) (“The reviewing court shall . . . hold unlawful and set aside agency 
action, findings, and conclusions found to be . . . arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, 
or otherwise not in accordance with law”). 
69  See Chevron, 467 U.S. at 843 (“ ‘The power of an administrative agency to administer a 
congressionally created . . . program necessarily requires the formulation of policy and the 
making of rules to fill any gap left, implicitly or explicitly, by Congress.’ ” (quoting Morton 
v. Ruiz, 415 U.S. 199, 231 (1974))). 
70  5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A). The APA, as interpreted by the courts, also imposes a number of 
other requirements on rulemaking in § 553, including statements about legal authority, data 
supporting the rulemaking, an opportunity for public comment, responses to material com-
ments, and a defense of the final rulemaking as rationale and as a logical outgrowth of the 
proposed rule. See id. § 553(b)–(c); Weyerhaeuser Co. v. Costle, 590 F.2d 1011, 1031 (D.C. 
Cir. 1978); United States v. Nova Scotia Food Prods. Corp., 568 F.2d 240, 251 (2d Cir. 
1977). 
71  Citizens to Pres. Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402, 416 (1971) (citations omit-
ted). 
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view is a narrow one.”72 “The court is not empowered to substitute its judgment 
for that of the agency.”73 
The Supreme Court has provided some much-needed context to this rather 
amorphous standard over the years. The most commonly cited definition, from 
the Court’s opinion in Motor Vehicle Manufacturers Association of the United 
States v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company,74 holds that the 
“arbitrary and capricious” standard is violated when: 
the agency has relied on factors which Congress has not intended it to consider, 
entirely failed to consider an important aspect of the problem, offered an expla-
nation for its decision that runs counter to the evidence before the agency, or is 
so implausible that it could not be ascribed to a difference in view or the product 
of agency expertise.75 
A number of scholars have previously conducted studies of judicial review 
of administrative action.76 For a time, the scholarly, and political, consensus 
settled on a figure of 80 percent for the percentage of final rules that became 
the subject of judicial review.77 Cary Coglianese conducted a study to challenge 
that conventional wisdom and ultimately concluded that only about one quarter 
of the EPA rules are challenged in court.78 A similar study, conducted by Ste-
phen Johnson,79 limited the pool of final rules to those designated as “signifi-
cant”80 by the EPA between 2001 and 2005 and found that over 40 percent of 
 
72  Id. 
73  Id. 
74  Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass’n of the U.S., Inc. v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 
29 (1983). 
75  Id. at 43. 
76  See supra text accompanying note 25. 
77  For a list of sources claiming that litigants challenge 80 percent of the rules that EPA is-
sues see Cary Coglianese, Assessing Consensus: The Promise and Performance of Negotiat-
ed Rulemaking, 46 DUKE L.J. 1255, 1343–49 (1997). See also William D. Ruckelshaus, En-
vironmental Negotiation: A New Way of Winning, Address to Conservation Foundation’s 
Second National Conference on Environmental Dispute Resolution (Oct. 1, 1984), cited in 
Lawrence Susskind & Gerard McMahon, The Theory and Practice of Negotiated Rulemak-
ing, 3 YALE J. ON REG. 133, 134 (1985) (stating that almost 80 percent of the agency’s major 
rules were challenged while he was EPA Administrator). 
78  See Coglianese, Empirical Analysis, supra note 55, at 1129 (“data reveal that the actual 
rate is only about 26 [percent], and that even the most significant rules are subject to peti-
tions for review only about 35 [percent] the time”). 
79  Stephen M. Johnson, Ossification’s Demise? An Empirical Analysis of EPA Rulemaking 
from 2001–2005, 38 ENVTL. L. 767, 768–71 (2008). 
80  An Executive Order dictated how the agency was to define significance: 
Significant regulatory action” means any regulatory action that is likely to result in a rule that 
may: 
(1) Have an annual effect on the economy of $100 million or more or adversely affect in a mate-
rial way the economy, a sector of the economy, productivity, competition, jobs, the environment, 
public health or safety, or State, local, or tribal governments or communities; 
(2) Create a serious inconsistency or otherwise interfere with an action taken or planned by an-
other agency; 
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them were challenged in court.81 Further constraining the sample to only “eco-
nomically significant”82 rules, Johnson found that the percentage subject to ju-
dicial review rose to 75 percent (approaching the 80 percent consensus fig-
ure).83 
Scholars have directed their attention not only to the likelihood of judicial 
review, but also, perhaps more importantly, to the rate at which courts reverse 
or remand agency action. Prior to Coglanese’s and Johnson’s works described 
above, Don Elliott and Peter Schuck conducted the seminal study of judicial 
review of agency action.84 Elliott and Schuck, reviewing data from reported 
opinions of federal appellate courts from 1965, 1975, 1984, and 1985, found 
that approximately 44 percent of rulemakings succeeded on judicial review 
(suggesting some 56 percent of rules reviewed were reversed or remanded to 
the agency).85 Other scholars, particularly those associated with the regulatory 
reform movement, often cite Elliott and Schuck’s figure as evidence of a prob-
lem.86 Subsequent studies tend to support a lower rate of reversal, however. In 
another landmark study, Martha Humphries and Donald Songer compiled and 
analyzed a comprehensive database of opinions from United States Courts of 
Appeals from 1969 to 1988, finding a success rate of 58 percent for all agency 
decisions (suggesting some 42 percent of rules reviewed were reversed or re-
 
(3) Materially alter the budgetary impact of entitlements, grants, user fees, or loan programs or 
the rights and obligations of recipients thereof; or 
(4) Raise novel legal or policy issues arising out of legal mandates, the President’s priorities, or 
the principles set forth in this Executive order. 
Exec. Order No. 12,866, 58 Fed. Reg. 51,735 (Oct. 4, 1993). 
81  Johnson, supra note 79, at 785 (“Seventy percent of the significant rules that were chal-
lenged were issued under the Clean Air Act and more than 80 [percent] of the challenges 
were brought in the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit”). 
82  Economically significant rules are those rules subject to more stringent Office of Man-
agement and Budget review as “significant” by virtue of “hav[ing] an annual effect on the 
economy of $100 million or more or adversely affect the economy in a material way.” Id. at 
776 (citing 58 Fed. Reg. 51,738). 
83  Id. at 785 (“Half of the challenged rules were issued under the Clean Air Act and more 
than 90 [percent] of the challenges were brought in the D.C. Circuit.”). 
84  Schuck & Elliott, supra note 25, at 1007. As the title of their work suggests, Elliott and 
Schuck focused their analysis on the effect of the Chevron doctrine. However, their general 
figures regarding success rates of agency rulemakings in federal courts remain relevant to 
the discussion of all standards of judicial review. 
85  Id. at 1022 (“When the 1965, 1975, and 1984–85 data for reported opinions from all 
agencies are combined, a systematic difference in success rates emerges: Adjudications have 
enjoyed a long-term success rate of 57.8 [percent] (625 of 1082 cases), compared to only 
43.9 [percent] (25 of 57) for rulemakings—in other words, the success rate for rulemaking 
has been only three-quarters that for adjudications.”). 
86  See, e.g., Richard J. Pierce, Jr., Seven Ways to Deossify Agency Rulemaking, 47 ADMIN. L. 
REV. 59, 84 (1995) (citing Elliott and Schuck to support a claim that courts uphold less than 
50 percent of the legislative rules under the arbitrary and capricious standard). Johnson then 
subsequently wrote that “most empirical studies have found courts invalidate the rules in 30 
[percent]–40 [percent] of the cases.” Johnson, supra note 79, at 773. 
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manded to the agency).87 More recently, Coglianese reported finding that fed-
eral appellate courts uphold the agency decision in approximately half of the 
cases.88 
As many have noted, the success rate on judicial review can vary signifi-
cantly by administrative agency.89 Relevant to the analysis here, some promi-
nent studies have focused, at least in part, on the performance of EPA decisions 
when subject to judicial review. A contemporary of Elliott and Schuck, David 
Willison, found that for EPA decisions reviewed by the Court of Appeals for 
the District of Columbia between 1981 and 1984, the success rate was slightly 
higher 59 percent.90 In 1994, James Hamilton and Christopher Schroeder exam-
ined a subset of EPA rules (only those issued pursuant to the Resource Conser-
vation and Recovery Act (RCRA))91 and found that approximately 22 percent 
of those rules had been subject to a court remand or consent decree (meaning 
78 percent survived review).92 More recently, Thomas Miles and Cass Sunstein 
analyzed the published opinions of United States Courts of Appeals over a ten-
year period from 1996 to 2006 involving review of EPA and National Labor 
Relations Board (NLRB) “decisions either for arbitrariness or for lack of sub-
stantial evidence.”93 Miles and Sunstein found that “the overall rate of votes to 
validate agency decisions challenged as arbitrary is 64 percent.”94 Similarly, 
 
87  Humphries & Songer, supra note 25, at 215. 
88  See Coglianese, Empirical Analysis, supra note 55, at 1129 (“After petitions for review 
are filed challenging EPA rules, only about 29 [percent] of them ever result in a decision of 
an appellate panel. Voluntary settlement, it turns out, is a common means of disposing of 
judicial review litigation. Moreover, in those cases that do result in judges’ decisions on the 
merits, in at least half of the cases the agency decision is upheld entirely.”). 
89  See, e.g., Bradley C. Canon & Michael Giles, Recurring Litigants: Federal Agencies Be-
fore the Supreme Court, 25 W. POL. Q. 183, 184 (1972) (reporting that agency success rates 
before the Supreme Court range from 56 percent to 91 percent); Donald W. Crowley, Judi-
cial Review of Administrative Agencies: Does the Type of Agency Matter?, 40 W. POL. Q. 
265, 271 (1987) (finding that agencies classified as “economic” have a 79 percent success 
rate versus a 68 percent success rate for those classified as “social”); Roger Handberg, The 
Supreme Court and Administrative Agencies: 1965–1978, 6 J. CONTEMP. L. 161, 168 (1979) 
(reporting similar agency success rates ranging from 55 percent to 91 percent); Reginald S. 
Sheehan, Administrative Agencies and the Court: A Reexamination of the Impact of Agency 
Type on Decisional Outcomes, 43 W. POL. Q. 875, 880 (1990) (reporting no significant over-
all difference in success rates for “economic” and “social” agencies, but finding significant 
variation depending on the classification of “social” agencies’ decisions as “liberal” or “con-
servative”). 
90  David H. Willison, supra note 25, at 321. 
91  42 U.S.C. § 6901 (1994). 
92  See James T. Hamilton & Christopher H. Schroeder, Strategic Regulators and the Choice 
of Rulemaking Procedures: The Selection of Formal vs. Informal Rules in Regulating Haz-
ardous Waste, 57 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 111, 153 (1994). 
93  Miles & Sunstein, Real World, supra note 25, at 766. 
94  Id. at 767. This validation rate is the same as the rate they previously observed for courts’ 
deference to agencies under Chevron. See Miles & Sunstein, Empirical Investigation, supra 
note 25, at 825, 849 (analyzing 183 federal appellate cases reviewing EPA interpretations of 
statutes and finding that judges deferred to the agency 64 percent of the time). 
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Jason Czarnezki, analyzing ninety-three appellate cases decided between 2003 
and 2005, found an affirmance rate of 69 percent for the EPA’s decisions.95 
The dataset of EPA rules and cases reviewing them, from 1972 to the present, 
constructed for this study was generally consistent with these prior findings, 
showing an overall success rate of approximately 55 percent.96 
Though Cary Coglianese and others have drilled down further and inter-
preted the available data as indicative of a judicial review process that is less 
impactful than generally assumed,97 policymakers, and this work, remain right-
ly concerned about the roughly 40 percent of cases that result in rules being 
remanded or invalidated.98 More specifically, EPA administrators would like 
100 percent of the rules they finalize to survive judicial review unscathed, ra-
ther than have to deal with fixing, or completely reworking, a third of them.99 
Remand or invalidation means extra work on the back end for the agency, and 
if it could be avoided by including more support and/or information on the 
front end, that would be a rational response. 
B. Methodology 
This analysis relied on a dataset based on 131 EPA rules from 1973 to 
2017 that were subject to judicial review in one of the United States Courts of 
Appeals or the United States Supreme Court. The data were extracted from the 
rules themselves and the opinions reviewing them. That dataset was construct-
ed by first identifying, via a search query in LexisNexis,100 United States 
Courts of Appeal and Supreme Court cases wherein EPA rules were mentioned 
alongside arbitrary and capricious review. Those search results were then indi-
vidually screened to create the dataset of 131 cases that actually involved arbi-
trary and capricious review of the EPA rule(s) referenced in the opinion (as op-
posed to cases disposed of on other grounds, such as Chevron deference,101 or 
cases involving rules from other administrative agencies). The opinions from 
the culled list comprised the first half of the source data. From the list of cases 
 
95  Czarnezki, supra note 25, at 769, 782–84. 
96  Data is a result of a study conducted by author and on file with the author. 
97  See Coglianese, Empirical Analysis, supra note 55, at 1129–30. 
98  Johnson, supra note 79, at 773 (“When agencies’ rules are challenged in court, most em-
pirical studies have found courts invalidate the rules in 30 [percent] [to] 40 [percent] of the 
cases.”); id. at 768–69 (“commentators frequently reference . . . studies that have found 
agency rules are invalidated in 30 [percent] [to] 50 [percent] of the cases in which they are 
challenged.”). A simple average of the figures reported in the studies mentioned here yields a 
reversal rate of 38 percent. See supra text accompanying notes 86–9688. 
99  A simple average of the figures for review of EPA decisions discussed here yields a re-
versal rate of 32.5 percent. See supra text accompanying notes 91–96. 
100  The specific query searched the LexisAdvance database of published Federal Courts of 
Appeal and United States Supreme Court opinions for the following terms in combination: 
“EPA” and “rule” and “arbitrary and capricious.” The search returned 1,529 opinions that 
satisfied the parameters (search results on file with author). 
101  See supra notes 94–95 and accompanying text. 
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a list of the rules subject to review in those cases was produced. The Federal 
Register entries for those rules comprised the second half of the source data. 
The opinions included within the source data were then coded on a binary 
dimension indicating that the EPA rule subjected to arbitrary and capricious re-
view was either: (1) upheld or (2) reversed or remanded to the agency.102 That 
binary coding comprised one half of the data necessary to perform a statistical 
analysis. The page count for each of the Federal Register entries for the identi-
fied rules comprised the other half of the data necessary to test the insulations 
hypothesis. 
Statistical analysis was then performed using IBM SPSS Statistics soft-
ware.103 Specifically, two partial correlation and two simple regression anal-
yses104 were performed on the dataset and a subset of the dataset, as well as de-
scriptive statistical analyses for both the complete dataset and the selected 
subset. The partial correlation analyses performed produced the zero-order cor-
relations (correlations without any control variables) between the year of the 
final rule, the pages in that rule’s Federal Register entry, and whether that rule 
was upheld on judicial review; the analyses also produced the partial correla-
tion of the pages in that rule’s Federal Register entry with whether that rule was 
upheld on judicial review (controlling for the year the rule was promulgated).105 
The descriptive statistics revealed, among other things, the means, medians, 
and standard deviations for Federal Register pages. The boxplots produced with 
those descriptive statistics allowed for the identification, and subsequent re-
moval, of outliers. After the outliers were removed from both the complete da-
taset and the selected subset, the partial correlation and regression analyses 
were re-run, producing a second set of results for each. 
C. Results 
Table 1 provides the results testing for partial correlations on the entire da-
taset of EPA rules between the pages in a rule’s Federal Register entry, whether 
that rule was upheld on judicial review, and the year of the final rule. The re-
sults show both zero-order correlations and correlations controlling for the year 
of the final rule. 
 
102  In the dataset, a code “2.0” indicated a rule being upheld, while a code “1.0” indicated a 
rule being reversed or remanded. 
103  IBM SPSS Statistics, Version 25.0 (2017). 
104  Correlation analysis identifies the association (magnitude and direction) between two 
variables, or the absence of a significant association. See Introduction to Correlation and Re-
gression Analysis, BOSTON U. SCH. PUB. HEALTH, http://sphweb.bumc.bu.edu/otlt/MPH-Mod 
ules/BS/BS704_Multivariable/BS704_Multivariable5.html (last visited Jan. 27, 2020). Re-
gression analysis generates a model meant to predict the value of one variable based on the 
known value of the other. See Gallo, supra note 50. 
105  Controlling for the year was necessary to ensure that the strong, positive linear relation-
ship between year and rule length, observed in the larger dataset and reported supra, did not 
influence the results in testing the insulation hypothesis. 
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TABLE 1: CORRELATIONS  
Control Variables Number of 
Pages in Final 
Rule Fed. 
Reg. Entry? 
Reverse Year (Final 
Rule) 
-None-a Number of Pages 
in Final Rule Fed. 
Reg. Entry? 
Correlation 1.000 -.101 .258 
Significance 
(2-tailed) 
. .251 .003 
df 0 129 129 
Reverse/Remand Correlation -.101 1.000 .101 
Significance 
(2-tailed) 
.251 . .249 
df 129 0 129 
Year (Final Rule) Correlation .258 .101 1.000 
Significance 
(2-tailed) 
.003 .249 . 




Number of Pages 
in Final Rule Fed. 
Reg. Entry? 
Correlation 1.000 -.132  
Significance 
(2-tailed) 
. .134  
df 0 128  
Reverse/Remand Correlation -.132 1.000  
Significance 
(2-tailed) 
.134 .  
df 128 0  
a. Cells contain zero-order (Pearson) correlations. 
The zero-order correlation between the number of Federal Register pages a 
rule comprises and its fate on judicial review is both very low (-0.101) and not 
statistically significant (p = 0.251). Furthermore, the sign of the correlation 
(negative) is the opposite of hypothesized; a significant negative correlation 
would indicate that shorter rules enjoy more success when subjected to arbitrar-
iness review. The partial correlation is only slightly different (-0.132) and, 
though closer to significance, still falls short (p = 0.134). The slight change 
from the zero-order correlation is due to the positive correlations between the 
year and both the number of pages in a rule and a rule’s resilience to judicial 
review. 
Table 2 provides the summary results for a regression analysis, which 
sought to determine whether the number of Federal Register pages was a good 
predictor of whether a rule was upheld on judicial review. 
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TABLE 2: MODEL SUMMARY 
Model R R Square Adjusted R Square Std. Error of the 
Estimate 
1 .101a .010 .003 .49881 
a. Predictors: (Constant), Number of Pages in Final Rule Fed. Reg. Entry? 
The low R-square result (0.010) indicates that the regression model only 
explains 1 percent of the variance in the data. Coupled with the lack of a statis-
tically significant correlation, these initial findings suggest that no relationship 
exists between the length of a rule and its fate on judicial review. Put simply, 
this finding does not support the insulation hypothesis. 
In order to determine whether the data were skewed by outliers (particular-
ly lengthy rules that were overturned or particularly short rules that were up-
held), it is useful to examine the descriptive statistics for the data set. Table 3 
presents the mean and median number of pages for two groups of rules—those 
that were reversed or remanded and those that were upheld. Figure 4 presents 
box plots of these groups. 
The simple descriptive results are revealing. Both the mean (63.5 pages 
versus 52.0 pages) and the median (53.0 pages versus 44.5 pages) figures were 
slightly higher for the group of reversed or remanded rules than the group of 
upheld rules. That is consistent with the weak negative correlation reported 
above and inconsistent with the insulation hypothesis. Figure 4 reveals a total 
of seven outliers (five in the upheld group and two in the reversed or remanded 
group). 
TABLE 3: DESCRIPTIVES 
 Reverse Statistic Std. Error 
Number of Pages 





Mean 63.51 7.318 
95% Confidence Inter-







5% Trimmed Mean 58.24  
Median 53.00  
Variance 3159.392  
Std. Deviation 56.208  
Upheld Mean 52.01 6.748 
95% Confidence Inter-







5% Trimmed Mean 44.53  
Median 33.50  
Variance 3278.577  
Std. Deviation 57.259  
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FIGURE 4 
Table 4 presents the partial correlation results for the dataset with the seven 
identified outliers removed. 
TABLE 4: CORRELATIONS 





Reverse Year (Final 
Rule) 
-None-a Number of Pages in 
Final Rule Fed. Reg. 
Entry? 
Correlation 1.000 -.222 .257 
Significance (2-
tailed) 
. .013 .004 
df 0 122 122 
Reverse/Remand Correlation -.222 1.000 .093 
Significance (2-
tailed) 
.013 . .305 
df 122 0 122 
Year (Final Rule) Correlation .257 .093 1.000 
Significance (2-
tailed) 
.004 .305 . 
df 122 122 0 
Year (Final 
Rule) 
Number of Pages in 
Final Rule Fed. Reg. 
Entry? 
Correlation 1.000 -.255  
Significance (2-
tailed) 
. .004  
df 0 121  
Reverse/Remand Correlation -.255 1.000  
Significance (2-
tailed) 
.004 .  
df 121 0  
a. Cells contain zero-order (Pearson) correlations. 
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With the outliers excluded, a different statistical picture emerges. The zero-
order correlation between the number of Federal Register pages a rule compris-
es and its fate on judicial review is now slightly more substantial (-0.222) and, 
more importantly, statistically significant (p = 0.013). However, the sign of the 
correlation (negative) remains the opposite of hypothesized, indicating that a 
significant inverse relationship exists between the number of pages in a rule 
and whether that rule survives judicial review. In other words, at least for the 
rules in the dataset, shorter rules, rather than longer rules, were upheld more 
often. The partial correlation shows the same directionality with a slightly 
stronger (-0.255) and more statistically significant (p = 0.004) effect. The 
change from the zero-order correlation can be explained by the removal of the 
positive correlations between the year and both the number of pages in a rule 
and a rule’s resilience to judicial review, which would tend to soften or coun-
teract the observed negative correlation. 
Table 5 provides the summary results for a regression analysis with the 
outliers excluded. Again, the regression attempts to model whether the number 
of Federal Register pages was a good predictor of whether a rule was upheld on 
judicial review. 
TABLE 5: MODEL SUMMARY 
Model R R Square Adjusted R Square Std. Error of the 
Estimate 
1 .222a .049 .041 .48991 
a. Predictors: (Constant), Number of Pages in Final Rule Fed. Reg. Entry? 
Interestingly, despite the significant negative correlations reported above, 
the regression model cannot explain a large percentage of the variance in the 
data. Indeed, the R-squared result indicates that the model explains less than 5 
percent of the variance. Taken together these results suggest that although 
shorter rules tended to enjoy more success when reviewed by courts, the length 
of a given rule is not a particularly accurate predictor of whether or not it will 
survive judicial review. Logically, this result makes sense. A particularly accu-
rate regression model based on a negative correlation would suggest that poli-
cymakers could better insulate their decisions from judicial review by explain-
ing them less fully. Put another way: the statistically significant negative 
correlation simply disproves the insulation hypothesis, while a strong R-
squared regression model would provide evidence for a directly opposite hy-
pothesis. 
Examining the dataset of 131 rules more closely, one finds that a substan-
tial subset of them (31) are rules merely approving or disapproving of State 
Implementation Plans (SIPs) under the Clean Air Act’s National Ambient Air 
Quality Standards (NAAQS) program.106 There is reason to suspect that these 
 
106  42 U.S.C. § 7409 (2018); Data on file with author. 
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rules may be skewing the sample. Such SIP rules tend to be shorter: the mean 
length of the thirty-one rules in the dataset that promulgated approvals (or dis-
approvals) of SIPs was twenty-four pages, whereas the mean length of the re-
maining one hundred rules in the dataset was sixty-seven pages.107 SIP rules 
tend to be upheld by United States Courts of Appeal: of the thirty-one rules in 
the dataset that promulgated approvals (or disapprovals) of SIPs, twenty-one 
(67.7 percent) were upheld, whereas of the remaining one hundred rules, only 
fifty-one (51.0 percent) were upheld.108 
Table 6 presents the partial correlation results for the subset of rules not re-
lated to SIP approvals. Again, the correlations tested were between the pages in 
a rule’s Federal Register entry, whether that rule was upheld on judicial review, 
and the year of the final rule. Table 7 provides the summary results for a re-
gression analysis, which sought to determine whether the number of Federal 
Register pages was a good predictor of whether a rule was upheld on judicial 
review. 
TABLE 6: CORRELATIONS 










-None-a Number of Pages in 
Final Rule Fed. 
Reg. Entry? 
Correlation 1.000 -.070 .383 
Significance (2-
tailed) 
. .486 .000 
df 0 98 98 
Reverse/Remand Correlation -.070 1.000 .109 
Significance (2-
tailed) 
.486 . .281 
df 98 0 98 
Year (Final Rule) Correlation .383 .109 1.000 
Significance (2-
tailed) 
.000 .281 . 
df 98 98 0 
Year (Final 
Rule) 
Number of Pages in 
Final Rule Fed. 
Reg. Entry? 
Correlation 1.000 -.122  
Significance (2-
tailed) 
. .228  
 
107  Data is a result of a study conducted by author and on file with author. 
108  Comparing these affirmance rates with those reported by prior studies, see supra notes 
85–98 and accompanying text, both figures are within the range of reported results. The 51.0 
percent affirmance figure is more consistent with the average of all the studies (reversal rate 
of 46 percent), whereas the 67.7 percent affirmance figure is very consistent with the average 
of the EPA-specific studies (reversal rate of 32.5 percent). 
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df 0 97  
Reverse/Remand Correlation -.122 1.000  
Significance (2-
tailed) 
.228 .  
df 97 0  
a. Cells contain zero-order (Pearson) correlations. 
TABLE 7: MODEL SUMMARY 
Model R R Square Adjusted R Square Std. Error of the 
Estimate 
1 .070a .005 -.005 .50372 
a. Predictors: (Constant), Number of Pages in Final Rule Fed. Reg. Entry? 
Comparing the results for this subset of the data to the results for the entire 
dataset reported above, there is little remarkable difference. As expected, (due 
to the relatively higher rate of affirmance and short length of the SIP-related 
rules removed to form the subset) the magnitude of the negative correlations 
both for zero-order and partial correlations was diminished. Importantly for the 
robustness of this study’s findings, the sign did not change, indicating that the 
observed negative correlation was not simply a result of the SIP-related rule-
makings skewing the data. The regression analysis also did not change signifi-
cantly; in fact, with the SIP-related rulemakings removed, the R-squared result 
actually marginally increased. 
To complete a thorough analysis, the subset was also subjected to the same 
descriptive statistics workup as the entire dataset above. Table 8 presents the 
mean and median number of pages for two groups of rules within the subset–
those non-SIP-related rules that were reversed or remanded and those that were 
upheld. Figure 5 presents box plots of these groups. 
TABLE 8: DESCRIPTIVES 
 Reverse Remand Statistic Std. Error 
Number of Pages in 




Mean 71.88 8.254 
95% Confidence 







5% Trimmed Mean 67.34  
Median 75.00  
Variance 3338.193  
Std. Deviation 57.777  
Upheld Mean 63.47 8.714 
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95% Confidence 







5% Trimmed Mean 56.19  
Median 40.00  
Variance 3872.414  
Std. Deviation 62.229  
FIGURE 5 
Despite removing the SIP-related rules from both groups, the mean (71.9 
pages versus 63.5 pages) and the median (75.0 pages versus 40.0 pages) figures 
remained higher for the group of reversed or remanded rules than the group of 
upheld rules. Again, that is consistent with the weak negative correlation re-
ported above and inconsistent with the insulation hypothesis. Figure 5 reveals a 
total of six outliers (four in the upheld group and two in the reversed or re-
manded group). 
Table 9 presents the partial correlation results for the most refined subset of 
the data tested (excluding SIP-related rules and excluding outliers within that 
subset). Table 10 presents the regression analysis results for that same stylized 
subset. 
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TABLE 9: CORRELATIONS 
Control Variables Number of 
Pages in Final 





-None-a Number of Pages in 
Final Rule Fed. 
Reg. Entry? 
Correlation 1.000 -.183 .405 
Significance 
(2-tailed) 
. .078 .000 
df 0 92 92 
Reverse/Remand Correlation -.183 1.000 .098 
Significance 
(2-tailed) 
.078 . .347 
df 92 0 92 
Year (Final Rule) Correlation .405 .098 1.000 
Significance 
(2-tailed) 
.000 .347 . 
df 92 92 0 
Year (Final 
Rule) 
Number of Pages in 
Final Rule Fed. 
Reg. Entry? 
Correlation 1.000 -.244  
Significance 
(2-tailed) 
. .018  
df 0 91  
Reverse/Remand Correlation -.244 1.000  
Significance 
(2-tailed) 
.018 .  
df 91 0  
a. Cells contain zero-order (Pearson) correlations. 
TABLE 10: MODEL SUMMARY 
Model R R Square Adjusted R Square Std. Error of the 
Estimate 
1 .183a .033 .023 .49690 
a. Predictors: (Constant), Number of Pages in Final Rule Fed. Reg. Entry? 
Unlike the results for the complete dataset, the negative zero-order correla-
tion did not become significant when the outliers were removed. However, a 
significant and stronger negative partial correlation (-0.244, p = 0.018) again 
emerged once the positive correlation with the year was controlled for. The du-
plication of this significant result in the subset of data that excludes the poten-
tially abnormal SIP-related rules adds support to the findings from the complete 
dataset, which invalidated the insulation hypothesis. The regression analysis on 
the subset with outliers excluded also produced similar results to the regression 
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analysis on the complete dataset with outliers excluded. The regression model 
still cannot explain a large percentage of the variance in the data in the subset. 
Here, the R-squared result indicates that the model explains less than 4 percent 
of the variance. 
Overall, the results of these analyses taken together disprove the insulation 
hypothesis. Among the rules in the dataset, and among the rules in the tested 
subset, the length of a rule was not positively related to its treatment by the 
courts on judicial review. Indeed, once the outliers were removed, a significant 
negative relationship emerged. However, that negative relationship could not 
form the basis of a useful predictive model. One ultimately must conclude that 
no useful relationship exists between a rule’s length and whether a court de-
cides to reverse or remand it when subjecting it to arbitrary and capricious re-
view. Thus, an administrator directing his or her staff to write more in every 
rule cannot rationally justify that deployment of resources on the basis of 
threatened judicial review. 
In 2010, David Zaring helpfully aggregated and compared many of the 
above-referenced prior studies of judicial review.109 His literature review pro-
vides important context for this study’s results. Zaring’s graphical presentation 
of the observed rates of success on judicial review over time suggests the lack 
of a significant relationship between the year of judicial review and the out-
come of that review.110 Because of the strong positive correlation between 
years and pages, if the insulation hypothesis held true, one would expect to see 
the observed judicial review success rate increase over time. Zaring’s analysis 
does not show such a trend and thus provides some additional evidence against 
the insulation hypothesis and consistent with the results here. 
D. Anecdotal Examples 
Behind the empirical results lie some interesting and illuminating compari-
sons of individual cases dealing with rules pertaining to similar subjects. Two 
rules concerning gasoline additives provide a simple illustration that anecdotal-
ly supports the empirical findings and cuts against the hypothesis that the in-
creased length of environmental regulations is a necessary reaction to more 
searching judicial inquiry, rather than a product of overzealous risk aversion. In 
1973, the EPA finalized a “Regulation of Fuels and Fuel Additives” that was 
the first control of lead added to gasoline.111 The Federal Register entry for the 
final rule was eight pages.112 The rule was upheld by the D.C. Circuit in Ethyl 
Corp. v. EPA.113 Twenty-five years later, the EPA promulgated another “Regu-
 
109  David Zaring, Reasonable Agencies, 96 VA. L. REV. 135, 135 (2010). 
110  Id. at 172. 
111  Regulation of Fuels and Fuel Additives: Control of Lead Additives in Gasoline, 38 Fed. 
Reg. 33,734 (Dec. 6, 1973). 
112  Id. at 33,734–41. 
113  Ethyl Corp. v. EPA, 541 F.2d 1, 12 n.15, 55 (D.C. Cir. 1976) (en banc). 
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lation of Fuels and Fuel Additives” that was subject to judicial review.114 The 
Federal Register entry for that rule, setting baseline requirements for foreign-
produced gasoline, was thirty-six pages (more than four times longer).115 That 
rule was upheld by the D.C. Circuit in George E. Warren Corp. v. EPA.116 The 
fact that the latter rule was significantly longer could not have been a response 
to the review of the earlier rule. Both rules successfully survived judicial re-
view, despite the disparity in length. 
A set of cases dealing with Prevention of Significant Deterioration (PSD) 
regulations under the Clean Air Act’s NAAQS program117 tell a similar story. 
The first set of PSD rules,118 promulgated in 1974 and 1975, were challenged in 
Sierra Club v. Environmental Protection Agency.119 The D.C. Circuit “[found] 
no ground on which to disturb the regulations under review, and . . . therefore 
affirm[ed] the EPA ‘Prevention of Significant Air Quality Deterioration’ regu-
lations.”120 The regulations totaled nineteen pages.121 
The EPA updated and expanded upon those PSD regulations multiple times 
over the years since their initial promulgation, including in 2002.122 Those reg-
ulations totaled 105 Federal Register pages, more than five times the length of 
the 1970s PSD rules.123 Nonetheless, the D.C. Circuit found that “two aspects 
of the 2002 rule rest[ed] on impermissible interpretations of the Act and a third 
[was] arbitrary and capricious.”124 The arbitrary and capricious component of 
the rule exempted sources undergoing changes from recordkeeping require-
ments if those sources themselves determined that the changes could not rea-
sonably qualify as “modifications” for permitting purposes.125 The court found 
that the EPA had failed to provide a reasoned explanation for its inclusion of 
 
114  Regulation of Fuels and Fuel Additives: Baseline Requirements for Gasoline Produced 
by Foreign Refiners, 62 Fed. Reg. 45,533 (Aug. 28, 1997). 
115  Id. at 45,533–68. 
116  George E. Warren Corp. v. EPA, 159 F.3d 616, 629 (D.C. Cir. 1998). 
117  42 U.S.C. § 7409 (1977). 
118  Final PSD regulations were published December 5, 1974, (Approval and Promulgation 
of Implementation Plans: Prevention of Significant Air Quality Deterioration, 39 Fed. Reg. 
42,510 (Dec. 5, 1974)), and were amended slightly on January 16, 1975 (Approval and 
Promulgation of Implementation Plans: Prevention of Significant Air Quality Deterioration; 
Correction, 40 Fed. Reg. 2,802 (Jan. 16, 1975)), June 12, 1975 (Approval and Promulgation 
of Implementation Plans: Prevention of Significant Air Quality Deterioration, 40 Fed. Reg. 
25,004 (June 12, 1975)), and Sept. 10, 1975 (Approval and Promulgation of Implementation 
Plans: Prevention of Significant Air Quality Deterioration, 40 Fed. Reg. 42,011 (Sept. 10, 
1975)). 
119  Sierra Club v. EPA, 540 F.2d 1114, 1119–20 (D.C. Cir. 1976). 
120  Id. at 1140. 
121  See Final PSD Regulations, supra note 119. 
122  Prevention of Significant Deterioration (PSD) and Nonattainment New Source Review 
(NSR), 67 Fed. Reg. 80,189–90 (Dec. 31, 2002). 
123  Compare id., with PSD Regulations, supra note 118. 
124  New York v. EPA, 413 F.3d 3, 10 (D.C. Cir. 2005). 
125  Id. at 11. 
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the aforementioned exemption, despite publishing a rule of more than 100 Fed-
eral Register pages.126 
These stories reflect just two pairs of rules and cases that exemplify the 
empirical results. It is likely that others tell supporting (and conflicting) stories; 
however, when aggregated, the cases in the sample demonstrate a significant 
negative correlation that disproves the insulation hypothesis. The anecdotal ev-
idence adds some weight to that conclusion, but, more importantly, it presents a 
picture of how and why the number of pages in a final rule is not a good predic-
tor of that rule’s fate when subjected to arbitrariness review. 
V. THE SOCIALLY BENEFICIAL HYPOTHESIS 
A. Introduction 
The second potential correlation this piece will investigate is the relation-
ship between the number of words in a rule and the quantified net benefits of 
that rule. At least since President Reagan issued Executive Order 12,291 in 
1981,127 agencies have been required to provide cost-benefit analyses for “ma-
jor rules” to the Office of Management and Budget.128 Scholars have long 
pointed to this command itself as a cause of the purported ossification of rule-
making activity.129 No study as of yet has examined whether the content of 
those cost-benefit analyses reveals anything about the pattern of rulemaking in 
 
126  Id. (“The agency failed to provide a reasoned explanation for how, absent such records, it 
can ensure compliance with NSR.”). 
127  Exec. Order No. 12,291, 46 Fed. Reg. 13,193 (Feb. 17, 1981). President Clinton issued 
Executive Order No. 12,866 in 1993, reaffirming and further clarifying this requirement. See 
Exec. Order No. 12,866, 58 Fed. Reg. 51,735 (Sept. 30, 1993). 
128  Defined as: 
any regulation that is likely to result in: (1) An annual effect on the economy of $100 million or 
more; (2) A major increase in costs or prices for consumers, individual industries, Federal, State, 
or local government agencies, or geographic regions; or (3) Significant adverse effects on com-
petition, employment, investment, productivity, innovation, or on the ability of United States-
based enterprises to compete with foreign-based enterprises in domestic or export markets. 
Exec. Order No. 12,291, 46 Fed. Reg. 13,193. (Feb. 17, 1981). President Clinton’s Executive 
Order No.12,866 applied the cost-benefit analysis requirement to “significant regulatory ac-
tion,” a category which, though very similar, also included any rule that may “[r]aise novel 
legal or policy issues arising out of legal mandates, the President’s priorities, or the princi-
ples set forth in this Executive order.” See Exec. Order No. 12,866, 58 Fed. Reg. 51,735 
(Sept. 30, 1993). 
129  See, e.g., Coglianese, Rhetoric and Reality, supra note 32, at 88 (“When President 
Reagan first established formal White House review of rulemaking under E.O. 12,291, crit-
ics raised separation of powers questions, but they also complained that OMB review would 
impede agencies’ ability to make new regulations.”); Alan B. Morrison, OMB Interference 
with Agency Rulemaking: The Wrong Way to Write a Regulation, 99 HARV. L. REV. 1059, 
1064 (1986) (“OMB control imposes costly delays that are paid for through the decreased 
health and safety of the American public.”); Pierce, supra note 86, at 62 (“The executive 
branch has contributed to ossification through the direct and indirect effects of the Office of 
Management and Budget’s (OMB’s) methods of implementing Executive Order 12,291.”). 
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this country. The empirical analysis herein presents an effort to at least begin to 
fill that gap. 
Independent of the relationship between a rule’s projected benefits (or 
costs) and its length, some empirical evaluation of the reported costs of rules 
over time has been conducted. One study examined annual compliance costs 
associated with environmental regulations from 1972 to 1990 and reported that 
they have grown steadily on an absolute basis and as a percentage of gross na-
tional product.130 Cary Coglianese has also written of the existence of a similar 
trend based on reports from the Office of Management and Budget.131 These 
studies essentially contend that regulations have become increasingly costly to 
regulated parties and to society. However, the costs of regulations only reflect 
one-half of the relevant cost-benefit equation. The analyses below rely on net 
cost-benefit figures reported by the EPA to determine whether there is a statis-
tically significant relationship between those figures and the length of rules. 
The results of this analysis could prove useful in assessing the cost-
effectiveness of the modern administrative state, using the number of words in 
a Federal Register entry as a proxy for the amount of work federal government 
employees devoted to crafting the associated rule. If regulations that have re-
quired more work have also produced more net benefits, there should be no 
cause for concern. 
B. Methodology 
This analysis relied on a dataset comprised of information pertaining to 
rules for which numerical cost-benefit analyses were readily available. That da-
taset was constructed by first finding a publicly available repository of Regula-
tory Impact Analyses (RIAs) produced by the EPA since 1981.132 That reposi-
tory included RIAs for fifty-one final rules promulgated pursuant to the Clean 
Air Act; of those fifty-one RIAs, forty included numerical cost-benefit analyses 
and thus formed the basis of the dataset.133 That subset of RIAs provided the 
first half of the source data. From the RIAs themselves a list of the rules they 
analyzed was produced. The Federal Register entries for those rules comprised 
the second half of the source data. 
Cost, benefit, and net figures for each regulation were then drawn from the 
RIAs included within the source data. Because the EPA often included a range 
of estimates in each RIA for costs and benefits (tying different estimates to dif-
 
130  Adam B. Jaffe et al., Environmental Regulation and the Competitiveness of U.S. Manu-
facturing: What Does the Evidence Tell Us?, 33 J. ECON. LITERATURE 132, 140 (1995). 
131  Coglianese, Rhetoric and Reality, supra note 32, at 91 (citing OFFICE OF MGMT. & 
BUDGET, DRAFT 2007 REPORT TO CONGRESS ON THE COSTS AND BENEFITS OF FEDERAL 
REGULATIONS 34 (2007)). 
132  Regulatory Impact Analyses for Air Pollution Regulations, EPA, https://www.epa.gov/ 
economic-and-cost-analysis-air-pollution-regulations/regulatory-impact-analyses-air-poll 
ution [https://perma.cc/YQ54-W7Q4] (last visited Jan. 6, 2020). 
133  Data is a result of a study conducted by the author and on file with the author. 
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ferent scenarios), the data collected was limited to the highest and lowest abso-
lute values for each parameter—costs, benefits, and net.134 These figures com-
prised one-half of the data necessary to perform the statistical analyses. The 
Federal Register entries for the identified rules yielded page counts, and freely 
available word-counting software was used to produce a word count for each of 
the Federal Register entries. The resulting page and word count figures com-
prised the other half of the source data. The high and low estimates of net bene-
fits (or costs) for each rule was divided by the number of words in that rule to 
produce high and low estimates of benefits (or costs) per word for each rule-
making. 
Finally, statistical analysis was performed using IBM SPSS Statistics soft-
ware.135 Again, the first test performed was a partial correlation, producing the 
zero-order correlations (correlations without any control variables) between the 
year of the final rule, the highest net benefit (or cost) estimate for that rule, the 
lowest net benefit (or cost) estimate for that rule, and the number of words in 
that rule’s Federal Register entry; the analyses also produced the partial corre-
lation of the words in that rule’s Federal Register entry with the high and low 
estimates of net benefits (or costs) (controlling for the year the rule was prom-
ulgated).136 A regression analysis was performed to determine whether the 
number of words in a Federal Register entry was a significant predictor of the 
high estimate of a rule’s net benefits. From the scatterplot associated with that 
regression analysis, one outlier was identified and removed. The partial correla-
tion and regression analyses were then re-run with the identified outlier exclud-
ed. In addition, a regression analysis was performed to verify that the year a 
rule was published was not a significant predictor of the high or low net bene-
fits (or costs) per word of that rule. This last test was meant to demonstrate em-
pirically the trend, or more precisely lack thereof, in benefits-per-word over 
time. 
C. Empirical Findings 
Table 11 provides the results testing for partial correlations on the dataset 
of EPA CAA rules between the number of words in a rule’s Federal Register 
entry, the highest net benefit (or cost) estimate, the lowest net benefit (or cost) 
 
134  Often the only, or most significant, factor affecting these values was the discount rate. 
The methodology employed treated different discount rates like any other scenario. This 
piece takes no position on the appropriate discount rate to be applied for cost-benefit anal-
yses or even if one should be applied at all. For a thoughtful discussion of the difficulties 
posed by discounting in environmental law, see generally Douglas A. Kysar, Discounting 
. . . on Stilts, 74 U. CHI. L. REV. 119 (2007). 
135  IBM SPSS Statistics, Version 25.0 (2017). 
136  Controlling for the year was necessary to ensure that the strong, positive linear relation-
ship between year and rule length, observed in the larger dataset and reported supra, did not 
influence the results in testing the insulation hypothesis. 
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estimate, and the year of the final rule. The results show both zero-order corre-
lations and correlations controlling for the year of the final rule. 
TABLE 11: CORRELATIONS 




















-None-a Number of 
Words in Final 
Rule Fed. Reg. 
Entry? 
Correlation 1.000 .520 .545 .199 
Significance 
(2-tailed) 
. .001 .000 .218 
df 0 38 38 38 
Highest Net 
(Cost or Benefit) 
Projection (mil-
lions $) 
Correlation .520 1.000 .923 .034 
Significance 
(2-tailed) 
.001 . .000 .836 
df 38 0 38 38 




Correlation .545 .923 1.000 .151 
Significance 
(2-tailed) 
.000 .000 . .353 
df 38 38 0 38 
Year (final rule) Correlation .199 .034 .151 1.000 
Significance 
(2-tailed) 
.218 .836 .353 . 




Words in Final 
Rule Fed. Reg. 
Entry? 
Correlation 1.000 .524 .531  
Significance 
(2-tailed) 
. .001 .001  
df 0 37 37  
Highest Net 
(Cost or Benefit) 
Projection (mil-
lions $) 
Correlation .524 1.000 .929  
Significance 
(2-tailed) 
.001 . .000  
df 37 0 37  




Correlation .531 .929 1.000  
Significance 
(2-tailed) 
.001 .000 .  
df 37 37 0  
a. Cells contain zero-order (Pearson) correlations. 
The zero-order correlations between the number of words in the Federal 
Register entry and both the high and low estimates of net benefits (or costs) re-
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port as modestly positive (0.520 and 0.545, respectively) and very significant (p 
= 0.001, p < 0.001). Because, within this dataset (as in the larger dataset exam-
ined supra), the correlation between a rule’s length and the year of its promul-
gation was positive, the partial correlations controlling for year provide the 
more useful picture. Very little change is observed when year is controlled for. 
The partial correlations between the number of words in the Federal Register 
entry and both the high and low estimates of net benefits (or costs) remain 
modestly positive (0.524 and 0.531) and very significant (p = 0.001, p = 0.001). 
Figure 6 provides a scatterplot and summary results for a regression analy-
sis, which sought to determine whether the number of words in a Federal Reg-
ister entry was a good predictor of the net social impact of that rule (measured 
by the high estimate of net benefits (or costs)). 
 
Figure 6 
The regression results indicate that the variation in the number of words in 
Federal Registry entries can at least in part be explained by the estimated social 
impacts of rules. More precisely, the R-square value (0.27) suggests that the 
regression model can explain about a quarter of the variation (27 percent) in the 
data. This suggests that the length of a rule can accurately predict the magni-
tude of the high estimate of that rule’s net benefits (or costs) for approximately 
one out of four rules. The relative inaccuracy of the model likely precludes any 
MODEL SUMMARY 
Model R R Square Adjusted R Square Std. Error of the 
Estimate 
1 .520a .270 .251 $42,713.70139 
a. Predictors: (Constant), Number of Words in Final Rule Fed. Reg. Entry? 
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practical application of it. In other words, policymakers, or stakeholders, should 
not rely on the length of a rule, by itself, to inform them of the likely net social 
benefits of that rule; independent cost-benefit analyses remain worthwhile and 
important endeavors. The hypothesis of interest to this study, however, con-
cerns not the continued utility of cost-benefit analyses, but the relative utility of 
lengthier, versus shorter, rules. The positive correlations between words and net 
benefits reported above confirm the socially beneficial hypothesis with respect 
to rules in the sample from the last four decades of EPA activity. 
In addition to displaying the graphical representation of the regression 
equation, the scatterplot, perhaps more importantly, reveals the presence of one 
prominent outlier—the Transport Rule.137 To present a fuller account of the sto-
ry that the data tells, and to ensure that the unusually beneficial (at least accord-
ing to EPA’s estimates) Transport Rule was not skewing the sample, the corre-
lation and regression analyses were performed on the dataset without that 
outlier. Table 12 provides the partial correlation results for the dataset of EPA 
CAA rules (minus the Transport Rule). The results show both zero-order corre-
lations and correlations controlling for the year of the final rule. 
TABLE 12: CORRELATIONS 



















-None-a Number of 
Words in Final 
Rule Fed. Reg. 
Entry? 
Correlation 1.000 .455 .520 .184 
Significance 
(2-tailed) 
. .004 .001 .261 
df 0 37 37 37 
Highest Net 
(Cost or Benefit) 
Projection (mil-
lions $) 
Correlation .455 1.000 .715 -.059 
Significance 
(2-tailed) 
.004 . .000 .723 
df 37 0 37 37 




Correlation .520 .715 1.000 .169 
Significance 
(2-tailed) 
.001 .000 . .303 
df 37 37 0 37 
Year (final rule) Correlation .184 -.059 .169 1.000 
Significance 
(2-tailed) 
.261 .723 .303 . 
df 37 37 37 0 
Year (final Number of Correlation 1.000 .474 .505  
 
137  Federal Implementation Plans: Interstate Transport of Fine Particulate Matter and Ozone 
and Correction of SIP Approvals, 76 Fed. Reg. 48,208 (Aug. 8, 2011). 
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rule) Words in Final 




. .003 .001  
df 0 36 36  
Highest Net 
(Cost or Benefit) 
Projection (mil-
lions $) 
Correlation .474 1.000 .736  
Significance 
(2-tailed) 
.003 . .000  
df 36 0 36  




Correlation .505 .736 1.000  
Significance 
(2-tailed) 
.001 .000 .  
df 36 36 0  
The zero-order correlations between the number of words in the Federal 
Register entry and both the high and low estimates of net benefits (or costs) 
remain modestly positive (0.455 and 0.520, respectively) and significant (p = 
0.004, p = 0.001). Both the magnitude and statistical significance of the correla-
tions saw a very small decrease from the analysis on the entire dataset. Again, 
controlling for the year of a given rule had little effect on the results, with par-
tial correlations between the number of words in the Federal Register entry and 
both the high and low estimates of net benefits (or costs) reporting as modestly 
positive (0.474 and 0.520) and significant (p = 0.003, p = 0.001). The removal 
of the identified outlier thus has little effect on the conclusions policymakers 
and scholars can draw from this analysis; the Transport Rule did not cause the 
observed positive correlations. 
Figure 7 provides a scatterplot and summary results for a regression analy-
sis, which sought to determine whether the number of words in a Federal Reg-
ister entry was a better predictor of the net social impact of that rule (measured 
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Interestingly, the regression model constructed on the narrower dataset per-
formed worse than the regression model based on the complete dataset. The R-
squared value suggests that, rather than explaining a quarter of the variance, 
this model now explains only about one-fifth (21 percent). Again, this result 
indicates that the number of words in a Federal Register entry alone does not 
provide a reliable predictor of the amount of net benefits a rule projects to im-
part upon society. The underwhelming regression models, however, do not dis-
prove the hypothesis or the correlation findings. Looking at the partial correla-
tions and regression analyses together, one can discern that over the same 
period that rules have gotten longer138 those rules have each also tended to pro-
vide more net benefits to society, but the positive correlation between those two 
variables does not translate into a predictive model that indicates precisely how 
much net benefit one can expect to gain by writing a longer rule. The socially 
beneficial hypothesis posited simply that a statistically significant positive cor-
relation exists, and the data confirm that. 
 One alternative way to formulate the socially beneficial hypothesis frames 
it in terms of net benefits (or costs) per word in a Federal Register entry. This 
formulation posits that over time the estimated net benefits per word of EPA 
regulations has been stable; there exists no statistically significant trend in ben-
efits per word over time. Table 13 shows the correlation results testing for a re-
lationship between both high and low estimates of net benefits (or costs) per 
word and the year. Figures 8 and 9 provide scatterplots and regression analyses 
examining that same potential relationship. Figure 8 uses the high net benefits 
(or costs) estimates to calculate the benefits per word data; Figure 9 uses the 
low net benefits (or costs) estimates. 
TABLE 13: CORRELATIONS 
 
138  See supra Part II. 
Model R R Square Adjusted R Square Std. Error of the 
Estimate 
1 .455a .207 .185 $23,950.94816 
a. Predictors: (Constant), Number of Words in Final Rule Fed. Reg. Entry? 
 Year (final 
rule) 
High Net Benefit 
per Word 
Low Net Benefit 
per Word 
Year (final rule) Pearson Correla-
tion 
1 -.040 .182 
Sig. (2-tailed)  .806 .261 
N 40 40 40 




-.040 1 .745** 
Sig. (2-tailed) .806  .000 
N 40 40 40 
20 NEV. L.J. 733 
772 NEVADA LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 20:2  
 FIGURE 8 
FIGURE 9 




.182 .745** 1 
Sig. (2-tailed) .261 .000  
N 40 40 40 
**Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed). 
MODEL SUMMARY 
Model R R Square Adjusted R Square Std. Error of the 
Estimate 
1 .040a .002 -.025 $247,344.28837 
a. Predictors: (Constant), Year (final rule) 
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The correlation results are telling. The magnitude of any observed correla-
tion was slight (-0.040 and 0.182) and inconsistent in direction between the two 
estimates of benefits (or costs) per word. Most importantly, neither correlation 
measured as close to statistically significant (p = 0.806 and p = 0.261). As one 
would expect given this lack of significant correlation, both scatterplots show 
variation in the data, but no pattern related to the passage of time emerges. The 
regression models confirm that the year of rulemaking proved a very poor pre-
dictor of net benefits per word. Indeed, the R-square value for the high esti-
mates of benefits per word (0.002) suggests that the model cannot even explain 
1 percent of the variation in the data. The regression model based on the low 
estimates did not fare much better, explaining about 3 percent of the variation 
in the data (0.033). Alone these regression analyses do not confirm (or refute) 
the socially beneficial hypothesis. However, they provide an additional level of 
robustness to the confirmation of the hypothesis reported above. 
D. Anecdotal Examples 
Two rules pertaining to regional haze provide some anecdotal support for 
the hypothesis that regulations are longer in part because they have a larger 
marginal impact and produce more benefits. The Federal Register entry for the 
Regional Haze Rule,139 promulgated by the EPA in 1999, comprised 69,647 
words. According to the EPA, the rule would produce net benefits of up to $3 
billion, which would equate to a net benefit of $43,074 per word (the low-end 
estimate was a net cost of $1 billion, equating to a net cost of $14,358 per 
word).140 In 2005, the EPA promulgated regulations updating the Regional 
Haze Rule, particularly focused on Best Available Retrofit Technology 
(BART) Determinations.141 The Federal Register entry included 84,252 
words.142 According to the EPA, the rule would produce net benefits of up to 
$12.0 billion, which would equate to a net benefit of $142,430 per word (the 
low end estimate was net benefits of $1.9 billion, equating to a net benefit of 
 
139  Regional Haze Regulations, 64 Fed. Reg. 35,714 (July 1, 1999). 
140  See INNOV. STRATS. & ECON. GRP., ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, REGULATORY IMPACT 
ANALYSIS FOR THE FINAL REGIONAL HAZE RULE 6 (1999), available at https://www3.epa.gov/ 
ttn/ecas/docs/ria/visibility-rule_ria_final-reg-haze-rule_1999-04.pdf [hereinafter REGULATO 
RY IMPACT ANALYSIS FINAL REGIONAL HAZE RULE]. 
141  Regional Haze Regulations and Guidelines for Best Available Retrofit Technology  
(BART) Determinations, 70 Fed. Reg. 39,104 (July 6, 2005). 
142  Data is a result of a study conducted by author and on file with author. 
MODEL SUMMARY 
Model R R Square Adjusted R Square Std. Error of the 
Estimate 
1 .182a .033 .008 $81,623.71590 
a. Predictors: (Constant), Year (final rule) 
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$22,551 per word).143 Though close in time, these Regional-Haze Rules actual-
ly show an increase in net benefit per word over time. 
A series of rules setting the National Ambient Air Quality Standards for 
ozone tell a similar tale. In 1997, the EPA updated the Ozone NAAQS in a 
Federal Register entry totaling 50,210 words.144 The EPA estimated that net 
benefits from that rule would accrue in an amount between $700 million and $1 
billion, which equates to a net benefit per word figure between $13,941 and 
$19,916.145 Eleven years later, in 2008, the EPA again updated the Ozone 
NAAQS.146 This time the Federal Register entry comprised 97,003 words and 
the projected net benefits ranged from $7 to $11 billion.147 Thus, the net benefit 
per word ranged from $72,163 to $113,399, an increase of more than five times 
the prior rule. The most recent update to the Ozone NAAQS came in 2015.148 
The Federal Register entry for that rule was the longest of the three by far, to-
taling 214,558 words. The estimated net benefits of the rule ranged from $1.5 
to $4.5 billion, producing a benefit per word range of $6,991 to $20,973.149 
Comparing these figures over time shows a spike in benefits per word with the 
2008 rule and a return close to 1997 levels with the (much longer) 2015 rule. 
Looking at the total benefits of each rule, rather than the per-word figures, one 
observes an example of the positive correlation between length and estimated 
social benefits. The inability to precisely model that relationship also emerges, 
particularly when comparing the 2008 and 2015 rules. 
These groups of similar rules exemplify the empirical results confirming 
the socially beneficial hypothesis. Perhaps on an intuitive level, these results 
will surprise few—longer, bigger, more complicated rules have more reach, 
more impact, and more quantifiable benefit to society. However, if that rela-
tionship were pervasively self-evident, many of the criticisms of the regulatory 
state mentioned at the outset would have fallen flat, or perhaps died out. In-
stead, they seem to be gaining, rather than losing, traction. The results reported 
here confirm empirically, that, at least with respect to the EPA’s CAA rulemak-
 
143  See REGULATORY IMPACT ANALYSIS FINAL REGIONAL HAZE RULE, supra note 140, at 6. 
144  National Ambient Air Quality Standards for Ozone, 62 Fed. Reg. 38,856 (July 18, 1997). 
145  See INNOV. STRATS. & ECON. GRP., ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, REGULATORY IMPACT 
ANALYSES FOR THE PARTICULATE MATTER AND OZONE 
NATIONAL AMBIENT AIR QUALITY STANDARDS AND PROPOSED REGIONAL HAZE RULE 65–66 
(1997), available at https://www3.epa.gov/ttn/ecas/docs/ria/naaqs-o3-pm_ria_proposal_19 
97-07.pdf. 
146  National Ambient Air Quality Standards for Ozone, 73 Fed. Reg. 16,436 (Mar. 27, 
2008). 
147  See generally AIR BENEFIT & COST GRP., ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, FINAL OZONE NAAQS 
REGULATORY IMPACT ANALYSIS (2008), available at https://www3.epa.gov/ttnecas1/regdata 
/RIAs/452_R_08_003.pdf. 
148  National Ambient Air Quality Standards for Ozone, 80 Fed. Reg. 65,292 (Oct. 26, 2015). 
149  See generally OFFICE OF AIR QUALITY PLANNING & STANDARDS, ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, 
REGULATORY IMPACT ANALYSIS OF THE FINAL REVISIONS TO THE NATIONAL AMBIENT AIR 
QUALITY STANDARDS FOR GROUND-LEVEL OZONE 15 (2015), available at https://www3.epa. 
gov/ttnecas1/docs/20151001ria.pdf. 
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ing, longer rules have provided more social benefits, and no significant change 
in benefits per word over time exists. From this empirical conclusion emerges 
the practical bottom line—policymakers at the EPA have rationally deployed 
resources to write longer rules when those rules provide more benefits. Fur-
thermore, the EPA’s rules have provided benefits to society on a relatively un-
changing per-word basis. 
VI. OTHER POTENTIAL EXPLANATIONS 
Many potential explanations exist for the observable trend in the length of 
individual rules published in the Federal Register over time—some rational, 
some irrational, some intuitive, others likely not. The empirical analyses above 
test only two of those multitude. Specifically, this work tests two hypotheses 
that would offer rational explanations for the trend towards longer rules. Alt-
hough the data supported one of those two hypotheses, that does not preclude 
the importance of other factors that this study was not designed to test. In fact, 
the regression analysis results suggest that the addition of other variables may 
yield a more accurate, and thus useful, predictive model. A fuller exploration of 
some untargeted hypotheses helps to contextualize and better understand the 
significance of the findings here. 
Thoughtful perusal of the history of the United States since the rise of the 
regulatory state in the 1970s yields a variety of possible drivers of increasing 
rule length. In the realm of technology, it would be difficult to understate the 
drastic changes to the way humans live, work, and relate with one another 
brought on by the rise of the personal computer in the 1980s and the internet in 
the 1990s. That technology certainly changed the capabilities of government 
agencies with respect to rule writing and record building. Outside of the agen-
cies themselves, the regulated community, and citizenry in general, gained ac-
cess to vastly more information and the capacity to author and quickly submit 
public comments based on that information.150 That latter reality intersects with 
one of the first intuitions of administrative scholars when told of the trend at the 
heart of this work; a good number of them would argue that the real driver of 
the increased length of regulations is external to the rulemaking agency—the 
number and complexity of public comments.151 Another common reaction 
points to politics, insinuating that perhaps one political party (chiefly, the 
 
150  See Thomas A. Bryer, Public Participation in Regulatory Decision-Making: Cases from 
Regulations.gov, 37 PUB. PERFORMANCE & MGMT. REV. 263, 263 (2013) (describing regula-
tions.gov as “an award-winning government Web site that has democratized the federal 
rulemaking process by making it easier for citizens to search, read, and comment on pro-
posed rules.”). 
151  See, e.g., Kerwin & Furlong, supra note 14, at 121 (using the number of public com-
ments as a proxy for the political interest in a rulemaking); Yackee & Yackee, supra note 31, 
at 1459 (attributing an observed increase in the number of words in National Park Service 
final rules at least in part to the requirement that agencies respond to public comments and 
noting that “[e]arly final rules provided almost comically brief responses to public com-
ments.”). 
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Democratic party) caused the increase in regulatory complexity based on that 
party’s view regarding the role of the federal government.152 
Unfortunately, the scope of the data collection for this work, and its analy-
sis, did not encompass the number of public comments the EPA received on the 
rules comprising the two datasets. A future study focusing on just that type of 
data for a wider sample of administrative rules would provide a welcome addi-
tion to the findings here.153 Until then, however, prior empirical research fortu-
nately sheds little light on the question. The Kerwin and Furlong study dis-
cussed at the outset somewhat undercuts the hypothesis that the number of 
comments drive the increasing length of rules. Kerwin and Furlong found that 
there was a comparatively strong negative correlation between the number of 
public comments received and the time it took to write a rule.154 Coupled with 
their finding of no significant relationship between length of rule text and dura-
tion of rulemaking process,155 these findings do not suggest the existence of a 
significant positive relationship between public comments received and rule 
length. Without specifically testing for that correlation, they tend to undercut 
the hypothesis that rules are longer simply due to an increase in public com-
ments. However, Kerwin and Furlong’s study was limited in scope and con-
ducted before the rise in personal computers, the advent of the internet, and the 
launch of regulations.gov156—all significant developments for the public com-
ment process. A future study using updated data to test the hypothesis that a 
rise in public comments explains the increase in the length of regulations would 
help clarify the picture. 
Commentators, scholarly and otherwise, tend to focus on partisan politics 
as an explanation for observed phenomena in regulatory activity.157 Cass Sun-
stein and Thomas Miles investigated arbitrary and capricious review through 
 
152  See, e.g., O’Connell, supra note 48, at 919 (testing, among others, the hypothesis that 
“agencies engage in less rulemaking activity under Republican Presidents than Democratic 
Presidents.”); see also Pugsley, supra note 12, at 477 (“Republicans now largely accept, as 
an article of faith, that the EPA is overregulating and thereby hurting the economy.”). 
153  Indeed, the author intends to design and conduct such a study. 
154  Kerwin & Furlong, supra note 14, at 131. 
155  See id. 
156  See Kerwin & Furlong, supra note 14. 
157  See, e.g., Miles & Sunstein, Real World, supra note 25, at 813–14 (testing whether the 
political party of the President who appointed a judge was a statistically significant predictor 
of that judge’s vote when reviewing agency activity); Terry M. Moe, Regulatory Perfor-
mance and Presidential Administration, 26 AM. J. POL. SCI. 197, 197 (1982) (testing for var-
iation in the regulatory activity of the NLRB, FTC, and SEC dependent on the President’s 
Party); O’Connell, supra note 48, at 957, 957 n.177 (empirically examining the trend of 
“Midnight Regulations” and finding no significant difference in that trend based on the polit-
ical party in power); Jay Cochran, III, The Cinderella Constraint: Why Regulations Increase 
Significantly During Post-Election Quarters 1 (Mercatus Ctr., Working Paper, 2001) (empir-
ical analysis of Federal Register pages added in post-election quarters, finding no statistical-
ly significant relationship between the President’s party and the number of pages added per 
month). 
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this lens.158 Sunstein and Miles empirically tested whether the party of the pres-
ident that appointed a judge made a statistically significant difference in the 
voting record of that judge when reviewing administrative rules.159 Their study 
classified agency actions as “liberal” or “conservative” and found that Demo-
cratic appointees were significantly more likely to vote to uphold liberal agency 
decisions and Republican appointees were significantly more likely to uphold 
conservative agency decisions.160 On the whole they found that Democratic ap-
pointees had a 69 percent rate of liberal voting versus a 55 percent rate for Re-
publican appointees.161 From these findings, Sunstein and Miles concluded that 
“the political party of the appointing president is a fairly good predictor of how 
a judge will vote in cases involving arbitrariness review.”162 Sunstein and 
Miles’s results provide an explanation for the variation in judicial review out-
comes, variation this study could not explain using the length of regulations as 
a potential indicator. No study as of yet, however, has set out to answer the 
question whether Democratic or Republican administrations tend to author sig-
nificantly longer rules, and, more interestingly, whether the influence of one 
political party could be responsible for the trend of increasing length over time. 
Because the party in power, at least with respect to the executive branch, is 
a relatively straightforward and publicly available data point, testing for a sta-
tistically significant relationship within the high-level data from the Office of 
the Federal Register proved relatively simple. Consistent with the prevailing 
perception of the Democratic party as relatively more pro-regulation than the 
Republican party,163 a year in which the president was a Democrat was coded 
2.00 and a year in which the president was a Republican was coded 1.00. Thus, 
if the increase in Federal Register pages per rule could be attributed primarily 
to Democrats, one would expect to see a positive correlation between the polit-
ical party variable and the pages per rule variable. Table 14 provides the results 
 
158  Miles & Sunstein, Real World, supra note 25, at 813. 
159  Id. at 813–14. 
160  Id. at 813. The effect intensified when sitting on a panel with all like-minded judges. 
“Democratic appointees show especially liberal voting patterns when sitting on all-
Democratic panels; Republican appointees show especially conservative voting patterns 
when sitting on all-Republican panels.” Id. 
161  Id. 
162  Id. at 813–14 (noting that “the political party of the president who appointed the two oth-
er judges on the panel is also a strong predictor.”). 
163  See, e.g., Richard L. Revesz, Environmental Regulation, Ideology, and the D.C. Circuit, 
83 VA. L. REV. 1717, 1717–18 (1997) (“Some commentators have criticized the D.C. Cir-
cuit’s politicization and have maintained that judges simply vote according to their policy 
preferences. In environmental cases, the allegation goes, judges appointed by Republican 
Presidents vote principally for laxer regulation and judges appointed by Democratic Presi-
dents vote for more stringent regulation.”); Russell Heimlich, Deepening Divide Between 
Republicans and Democrats Over Business Regulation, PEW RES. CTR. (Aug. 14, 2012), 
https://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2012/08/14/deepening-divide-between-republicans- 
and-democrats-over-business-regulation/ [https://perma.cc/6ML6-EYRF] (finding that “76  
[percent] of Republicans [versus only 41 percent of Democrats] say that government regula-
tion of business does more harm than good”). 
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for correlation analyses for these variables, reporting both zero-order and par-
tial correlations controlling for year. 
TABLE 14: CORRELATIONS 





-none-a Political Party 
R/D 
Correlation 1.000 .295 .272 
Significance (1-
tailed) 
. .031 .043 
df 0 39 39 
Pages per Rule Correlation .295 1.000 .958 
Significance (1-
tailed) 
.031 . .000 
df 39 0 39 
Year Correlation .272 .958 1.000 
Significance (1-
tailed) 
.043 .000 . 
df 39 39 0 
Year Political Party 
R/D 
Correlation 1.000 .123  
Significance (1-
tailed) 
. .226  
df 0 38  
Pages per Rule Correlation .123 1.000  
Significance (1-
tailed) 
.226 .  
df 38 0  
a. Cells contain zero-order (Pearson) correlations. 
It would appear from the zero-order correlations that indeed the political 
party of the president had a statistically significant (p = 0.031) positive correla-
tion (0.295) with the number of pages in the rules administrative agencies 
promulgated during his tenure. However, the partial correlation results control-
ling for year reveal that positive correlation to be weaker (0.123) and no longer 
significant (p = 0.226). These preliminary results are by no means conclusive 
on the larger empirical question about the effect of political party on rule 
length. Nonetheless, they suggest that the trend that this study attempts to ex-
plain by the insulation and socially beneficial hypotheses cannot easily be ex-
plained by politics instead. 
Among the myriad of explanations for individual rules getting longer, 
some of the more plausible may prove both difficult to test and relatively unin-
teresting in terms of implications for policymakers and commentators. Chiefly 
the rise of the personal computer as a tool for agency work and the internet as a 
method of commenting fit this description. Some data exist on the number of 
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personal computers available to agency employees over time,164 but, unsurpris-
ingly, those figures almost perfectly positively correlate with time (i.e., the 
government has more computing power every year).165 Similarly, the invention, 
and now reach, of the internet and access to it positively correlates with time 
(i.e., internet access and speed improve each year).166 As a consequence, it was 
outside the scope of this study to construct an empirical analysis that could iso-
late the effects of these technological advances on the length of regulations. A 
more detailed data compilation and analysis focused on these advances, per-
haps using more nuanced measures, would provide welcome insight. From a 
logical, rather than empirical, perspective it is difficult to imagine that neither 
the ease of word processing on a personal computer nor the widespread availa-
bility of information on the internet have any effect on the length and com-
plexity of rulemaking. 
VII. IMPLICATIONS OF FINDINGS 
The twin empirical analyses of this piece asked, and began to answer, im-
portant questions about the effectiveness of the administrative state in relation 
to the length of Federal Register entries. Policymakers, pundits, and the public 
need to understand if the criticisms of the regulatory state embodied by the me-
dia photos of large stacks of paper have practical significance or merely repre-
sent misguided finger-pointing. The results reported above suggest the latter, at 
least with respect to one of the two hypotheses tested. 
Empirical analysis of the data collected from EPA CAA rules confirmed 
the central claim of the socially beneficial hypothesis—longer rules have tend-
ed to confer more net benefits upon society. For policymakers, that finding 
counsels an approach that estimates the costs and benefits of a proposed regula-
tion early on in the process and then devotes resources (and Federal Register 
pages) to those rules that have the highest net benefits. Indeed, the numbers 
suggest this already happens. Pundits and commentators would do well to focus 
their scrutiny on the cost-benefit analyses underlying agency decisions, rather 
than the ultimate length of those decisions themselves. Scholarly critiques of 
this part of the administrative process abound,167 and much productive political 
 
164  See William Lehr & Frank R. Lichtenberg, Computer Use and Productivity Growth in 
US Federal Government Agencies, 1987–92, 46 J. INDUS. ECON. 257, 259, 267 (1998) 
(“us[ing] productivity data obtained from the Bureau of Labor Statistics’ (BLS) Federal 
Productivity Measurement Program, which was established for the specific purpose of track-
ing the labor productivity (real output per employee-hour worked) of federal government 
organizations, linked to data on computer use obtained from Computer Intelligence Infocorp 
(CII), a private marketing research firm.”). 
165  See id. at 267 (reporting data demonstrating that “computerization of public sector work-
places proceeded at a rapid pace [from 1987 to 1992]”). 
166  See Max Roser et al., Internet, UNIV. OF OXFORD, https://ourworldindata.org/internet  
(2020) (last visited Feb. 11, 2020). 
167  See e.g., FRANK ACKERMAN & LISA HEINZERLING, PRICELESS: ON KNOWING THE PRICE OF 
EVERYTHING AND THE VALUE OF NOTHING 9–11 (2004). 
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discourse could flow from that debate. For the citizenry, recognizing an overly 
burdensome regulatory state, an undoubtedly worthwhile and vital check in a 
democratic society, requires more than simply counting the pages of regula-
tions. The results of this study should put some minds at ease, at least with re-
spect to EPA regulations; they should also help better direct our scrutiny in the 
future. 
On the other hand, the data collected from United States Courts of Appeals 
decisions and the Federal Register failed to confirm the insulation hypothesis. 
For policymakers, the straightforward implication of that finding sounds obvi-
ous—simply making a rule longer will likely not better protect it from judicial 
review. It is the more nuanced, and admittedly unproved, implication that 
should cause them pause—perhaps devoting pages and pages in the Federal 
Register to exhaustively detailing the rationale for a given rule is not an effi-
cient use of pulp, ink, and human resources. The empirical result (the lack of a 
statistically significant finding) should also motivate scholars and commenta-
tors to further probe the utility of process requirements (judicially, legislatively, 
or administratively imposed) that add length and detail to Federal Register en-
tries, particularly in the “Statement of Basis and Reasons.” This work’s author 
looks forward to joining the debate in that arena. Finally, court and agency 
watchers in the public should take the results here as a reminder that the size of 
a rule reveals little about its propensity to last—courts invalidate short, simple 
rules and long, complex ones. 
VIII.STUDY LIMITATIONS 
As with any empirical study, significant and notable limitations cabin the 
results of this work. Two prominent limitations derive directly from the study’s 
design, while a third is extrinsic to the data collection and analysis. 
First, and most prominently, the samples used for this study were confined 
by design to environmental regulations, specifically those promulgated by the 
EPA. The motivations for that decision to narrowly define the scope of the data 
collection range from the purely practical (resource constraints) to the theoreti-
cal (EPA regulations attract scholarly and popular attention because they epit-
omize the sweeping reach and powerful impact of the modern administrative 
state). Though intentional, this sharp focus on the EPA did not come without 
drawbacks, the most significant of which clouds the results with respect to one 
untested explanation for the growing length of regulations. Scholars have ar-
gued that environmental problems, particularly those addressed by our laws, 
have become more complex over time.168 One might surmise that regulations 
 
168  Robert Glicksman & Christopher H. Schroeder, EPA and the Courts: Twenty Years of 
Law and Politics, 54 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 249, 252 (1991) (“The first wave of envi-
ronmental legislation was directed at the problems that were easiest to see and resolve. Burn-
ing rivers and lakes suffocating from massive algal blooms were obvious targets for reme-
diation. The smog covering the nation’s urban areas and the odors emanating from open 
solid waste dumps cried out for attention. . . . Just as the problems seemed obvious, so did 
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have responded to the increasing complexity of their targets by becoming long-
er and more complicated themselves. This study, limited as it is to EPA regula-
tions, could not control for, nor measure, that potential effect. 
Another limitation follows from the design choice to focus on Federal Reg-
ister entries as the measure of rule length, rather than Code of Federal Regula-
tions provisions. Looking at words, rather than pages, and at parts making up 
the Code of Federal Regulations, rather than rules published in the Federal 
Register, provides another measure of the observed trend. However, that meas-
ure paints a much noisier picture, as Figure 10 shows.169 Individual data points 
vary more sporadically from year to year due to the fact that some years saw 
fewer (or even no) new parts added to the Code of Federal Regulations, and the 
trend appears consistent with that observed in the Federal Register data. How-
ever, the regression model results suggest a more complicated picture. In addi-
tion to these analysis challenges, the data collection regarding the number of 
words added by a given rulemaking would have proved far more time consum-
ing, particularly for rules that have since been removed from, or even simply 
revised in, the Code of Federal Regulations. For those reasons, this study was 
designed with a Federal Register focus, acknowledging that it opens the results 
to an additional avenue of critique. 
FIGURE 10 
 
the most effective solutions. The early legislation required EPA and the states to prohibit or 
control industrial and municipal discharges from both stationary and mobile sources, typical-
ly by imposing end-of-pipe controls. A direct cause and effect relationship between compli-
ance with these limitations on pollutant discharges and a cleaner environment was simply 
assumed. Twenty years later, these early assessments of the nature of both environmental 
problems and their resolution seem naive.”). 
169  Data derived from McLaughlin & Sherouse, supra note 12. 
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An extrinsic limitation to the findings in this study bears repeating170 be-
cause of the findings on the socially beneficial hypothesis. The benefits and 
costs estimates that comprise one half of the data set come directly from EPA 
Regulatory Impact Analyses. Those analyses were necessarily performed at the 
time of the rulemakings they concern, predicting the benefits and costs to socie-
ty. Unfortunately for the purposes of this empirical analysis,171 the EPA has not 
maintained a consistent methodology with respect to calculating and modeling 
costs and benefits of rulemaking. Changes in that methodology over time make 
comparisons of cost-benefit figures over time less valid. The fact that this study 
uses a sample of exclusively CAA rules at least controls for variation in valua-
tion and methodology across environmental media and corresponding EPA of-
fices (e.g., air, water, solid waste). Nonetheless, any differences in methods 
over time unavoidably to some degree infect the results here. 
CONCLUSION 
The findings reported here suggest that while EPA regulations have been 
getting longer, they have also been conferring more benefits on society. If 
EPA’s activity reflects the larger trend across all agencies, which seems a rea-
sonable assumption, we need not worry so much about the increasing length of 
individual rules. Despite these findings, politicians will certainly continue to 
take photo opportunities with stacks of paper. Pundits and commentators will 
continue to decry the growing regulatory state. Voters will curse the govern-
ment bureaucracy and “red tape.” This work should mark the next step in a 
more informed debate—a debate for the first time grounded in comprehensive 
data and thorough analysis, rather than isolated big numbers and rhetorical the-
atrics. The findings here should prompt reexamination of administrators’ and 
general counsels’ approaches to avoiding judicial review. The findings should 
further prompt administrators to direct rule-writing resources on the basis of 
cost-benefit analyses, or, perhaps more accurately, should prompt them to at 
least acknowledge their existing tendency to unknowingly do so. Future studies 
could prompt reforms or reconsiderations in countless other areas. All of this is 
based on evidence, the preferred decision-making tool of the thousands of sci-
 
170  See supra Section IV.C. 
171  This is not to say EPA has not improved its cost-benefit analysis methodology over time. 
It is simply to point out that the inconsistent methodologies somewhat undermine the ability 
to compare figures over time, a necessary comparison for the empirical study here. 
MODEL SUMMARY 
Model R R Square Adjusted R Square Std. Error of the 
Estimate 
1 .524a .275 .253 13.009 
a. Predictors: (Constant), Words Per new CFR Part 
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entific experts that serve in agencies. Empirical study of the work of adminis-
trative agencies is vital to the continued success of our system of government, 
which remains dependent on their resilient and efficient work. 
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